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Couching Race in the Global Era*: 
Intra-Asian Racism in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon**
全球化年代的種族表述︰
從《臥虎藏龍》看亞洲內部的種族主義
Nick KALDIS
Department of Asian and Asian American Studies, Binghamton University (S.U.N.Y.)
賓漢頓大學亞洲及美亞裔研究系
Widely and often wildly praised by international audiences and film critics, Crouching Tiger, 
Hidden Dragon 臥虎藏龍 (dir. Ang Lee 李安, 2000; hereafter also referred to as CTHD) is 
one of the most successful Chinese-language films of all time, having earned in excess of $208 
million worldwide (as of 2001), and over $128 million in the United States, where it stands as the 
highest-grossing foreign language film of all time.1 Much of the academic scholarship on the film 
* I will use the terms “global,” “transnational,” “global/transnational capitalism,” etc. interchangeably throughout, 
in reference to the general underlying conditions of life on the planet, which are now by and large determined 
and driven by the imperative of capitalism to gain hegemony over every social formation and interaction, 
seducing or coercing all peoples and places to ascribe to the laws and demands of the profit motive and ceaseless 
acquisitiveness, unimpeded by geographical, national, local, or personal boundaries. This holds true in greater 
China, Asia, and America, regardless of recent upsurges in nationalism or cultural nationalism (in places like 
America and the PRC, for example). For more on globalization and [Chinese] culture, see Liu Kang’s book-
length study: Globalization and Cultural Trends in China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004); Emily 
Davis for a concise, nuanced definition of globalization in her “The Intimacies of Globalization: Bodies and 
Borders On-Screen,” Camera Obscura 62.21.2 (2006): 34-37; and Eqbal Ahmad for an analysis of the ways that 
globalization creates barriers and inequalities rather than smooth flows and broader distributions of people and 
wealth: “Knowledge, Place, and Power: A Critique of Globalization,” in ed. Ali Mirsepassi, Amrita Basu, and 
Frederic Weaver, Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World: Recasting the Area Studies Debate (Syracuse, 
New York: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 216-29.
** Ang Lee’s 李安	 deliberate orientalizing of old China begins with the title itself. “Crouching Tiger Hidden 
Dragon” 臥虎藏龍 at first glance appears to be an ancient aphorism. However, this particular arrangement of 
these four characters is apparently a modern construction, borrowed for the movie from the book title (the fourth 
entry in Wang Dulu’s 王度廬 “Crane-Iron Pentalogy” 鶴鐵五部曲, an acronym for “Crane Precious Sword 
Crouching Iron Pentalogy” 《鶴驚崑崙》、《寶劍金釵》、《劍氣珠光》、《臥虎藏龍》、《鐵騎
銀瓶》). “Crouching tiger” 臥虎 is traditionally used to describe an awe-inspiring government official, often 
used pejoratively, referring to an administrator who is an extremely severe enforcer of the law, a cruel, excessively 
violent person, or a fierce warrior. The oldest combination of the four characters in the title is “crouching dragon” 
臥龍. It refers to a sleeping dragon and, by extension, to a person of exceptional abilities (namely, a benevolent 
martial/intellectual genius) who remains in hermitage, undiscovered. The earliest applications of this combination 
are in references to Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮, 184-234 A.D., a.k.a. Kongming 孔明 and “Mr. Crouching Dragon” 臥
龍先生, famous general of the early Three Kingdoms era (220-265 C.E.). There is also a northern Zhou Dynasty 
(6 dynasties era) poem by Yu Xin 庾信 (513-581 C.E.) in which “藏虎” and “臥龍” are used to describe rocks 
and tree roots in the surrounding landscape. When glossed in reference works at all, the combination of the four 
characters comprising the title is described in dictionaries and compendiums of aphorisms as referring to “a 
person of rare talents”, “undiscovered person[s] of exceptional abilities,” “a collection of men of remarkable 
talents,” or “person[s] of outstanding talent, hero[es].” Many dictionaries do not list the aphorism, and in none of 
them is a primary ancient textual source for the aphorism given, indicating its historically recent origins.
1 See Su Tuo-Yu, Jang Hyun Kim, and Junhao Hong, “A Socio-Cultural Study of the Growing Popularity of 
Pan-Chinese Movies in the U.S.: Trends, Contributing Factors, and Implications,” Asian Cinema 18.1 (Spring/
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explores its global dimensions; the director himself and his long-time collaborator James Schamus 
have likewise stated in interviews and articles that the film is an authentically transnational2 co-
production, with Chinese, Taiwanese, Japanese, American, and other constituents contributing to 
its funding, personnel, locations, languages, audiences, profits, and awards.3 It is also, famously, 
Summer 2007): 66, 86-87. Despite its financial success and numerous awards, there has been some nitpicking 
concerning the popularity of the film in Asia, largely owing to its poor showing at the PRC box office. See Henry 
Chu, “‘Crouching Tiger’ Can’t Hide from Bad Reviews in China,” Los Angeles Times (Jan. 29, 2001): A1; James 
Schamus, “Letter to the Editor: ‘Tiger’ Scribe Schamus Responds to Article,” Variety (Feb. 11, 2001), http://
www.variety.com/article/VR1117793505.html?categoryid=9&cs=1 (accessed July 2, 2007); Derek Elley, “Asia 
to ‘Tiger’: Kung-fooey: ‘Hidden’ Draggin’ at the Orient B.O. despite Breaking Records in U.K,” Variety (Feb. 7, 
2001), http://www.variety.com/article /VR1117793505.html?categoryid=9&cs=1 (accessed Jul. 2, 2007); Mark 
Landler, “Lee’s ‘Tiger,’ Celebrated Everywhere but in China,” The New York Times (Feb. 27, 2001): E1; Jessica 
Tan, “Gongfu Not Good Enough?” The Straits Times (Singapore) (Feb. 12, 2001): L10; and others address the 
issue from many different perspectives.
2 Sheldon H. Lu defines transnational cinema “as an emergent mode of filmmaking [that] implies the trespassing 
of national borders in the processes of investment, production, circulation, and consumption.” See Sheldon H. 
Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels: Hollywood, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Transnational 
Cinema,” in ed. Sheldon H. Lu and Emilie Yueh-Yu Yeh, Chinese-Language Film: Historiography, Poetics, 
Politics (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 221.
3 See Schamus for a concise discussion of creating this “global film” and a history of the film’s multinational 
financing and production in his “The Polyglot Task of Writing the Global Film,” The New York Times, Arts and 
Leisure (Nov. 5, 2000): 25; see also Ang Lee, et. al., eds., Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: A Portrait of the Ang 
Lee Film (New York: Newmarket Press, 2000); “The Guardian/NFT Interview: Ang Lee and James Schamus,” 
Guardian Unlimited (Nov. 7, 2000), http://film.guardian.co.uk/interview/interviewpages/0,6737,394676, 
00.html#early (accessed July 5, 2007); and, Oriental Films, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon: An Interview with 
Ang Lee and James Schamus” (2001), http://www.orientalfilms.co.uk/newfilms/crouchingtiger/cthdconversation. 
htm (Accessed Jul. 17, 2007) for detailed production notes, including short biographies of many cast and crew. 
While acknowledging Ang Lee’s Taiwanese roots and New York residency of several decades, this essay will 
treat CTHD as both a transnational production and a Chinese-language film. Although Lee is a diasporic (New 
York based) Chinese filmmaker from Taiwan, he identifies himself as a “Chinese filmmaker” (Michael Berry, 
“Ang Lee: Freedom in Film,” in ed. Michael Berry, Speaking in Images: Interviews with Contemporary Chinese 
Filmmakers [New York: Columbia University Press, 2005], 352), and has clearly stated that CTHD is an attempt 
to provide a world-wide audience with a vision of his own “dream of China, a China that never existed, except 
in my boyhood fantasies” (Linda Sunshine, ed., Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Portrait of the Ang Lee Film 
[New York: Newmarket Press, 2000], 7). Emilie Yueh-Yu Yeh and Darrel William Davis aver “as far as its 
capital was concerned, this is indeed a Chinese project […] All the financial risk on this film was borne by Ang 
Lee, Xu Ligong […] and Bill Kong.” See Yeh and Davis, Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), 189. For a detailed treatment of Lee’s diasporic status as a key element of 
his filmmaking, see Christina Klein, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: A Diasporic Reading,” Cinema Journal 
the first Chinese-language film with record-breaking international box office and video profits. 
While transnational in its production and reception, CTHD is thoroughly “Chinese” in its diegesis, 
taking place entirely within the (imagined) historical, geographical, and linguistic boundaries of 
Qing Dynasty China. This combination of localized content with global box office success and 
international film awards has led many Chinese4 viewers to praise the film for attracting a world-
wide audience with an edifying representation of Chinese people and culture while simultaneously 
establishing an influential Chinese presence in the global film market. In CTHD, cultural 
globalization and cultural nationalism5 are wed harmoniously, embodying what Fran Martin has 
aptly characterized as the film’s construction of a new “Pan-Chinese cultural nationalism that 
constructs a triumphal, post-modern version of ‘Chineseness’”.6
While a variety of critics, journalists, and others have looked at the film from multiple 
theoretical perspectives, analyzing both its content and production – its ostensible “Chineseness,” 
its relationship to Hollywood film, its (purported) feminist subtext, its Orientalizing characteristics, 
its funding and profits, its reception in Asia, etc. – what has yet to be discussed is the ubiquitous 
logic of racial binarism in the film.
Han Chinese in this film are models of social conformity and propriety, displaying obedience 
to social mores, government authority, and laws, and upholding the quasi-Confucian jianghu 江
湖 (“knight-errant culture”) codes of righteousness, honesty, loyalty, trust, and respect. The Han 
heroes are represented as spiritually centered and martially supreme upholders of the status quo, 
thoroughly conservative and hostile toward any type of illicit, uncivil, or antisocial behavior. This 
holds true for both their public personae and their private – and intimate – relations as well. The 
lead non-Han characters, on the other hand, are violators of the same social mores, laws, and 
values dear to the Han characters. Displaying animal-like barbarity, they prioritize the carnal over 
43.4 (2004): 18.
4 Expanding on the definitions of Kenneth Chan and others (see Kenneth Chan, “The Global Return of the Wu 
Xia Pian [Chinese Sword-Fighting Movie]: Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon,” Cinema Journal 43.4 
[2004]: 14, n4), and echoing elements of Tu Wei-ming’s notion of “cultural China,” when I refer to the “Chinese” 
involved in both the production and reception of the film, I am using the term quite generally to include Chinese 
in the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and in the diaspora. In doing so, I also draw on the arguments of 
Rey Chow, who states that “the term ‘Chinese’” be inclusive of people from the PRC as well as “the populations 
of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other diasporic Chinese communities […] [whose] claims to being Chinese – in 
numerous historical and linguistic connections […] must also […] be granted their legitimacy.” See Rey Chow, 
Sentimental Fabulations, Contemporary Chinese Films: Attachment in the Age of Global Visibility (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007), 24.
5 For some of the historical antecedents of these terms and phenomena, see Prasenjit Duara’s discussion 
of (Levenson’s analysis of) “culturalism,” nationalism, and “culture protected by the state (politicization of 
culture).” See Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 56.
6 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 149.
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6 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 149.
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the mind and spirit, abandoning themselves to lust and impetuously acting on their emotional 
impulses.
Prior to presenting numerous examples of its racially dichotomized narrative structure, I 
will first contextualize CTHD with respect to discourses critical of globalization and its attendant 
cultural trends. I argue that this critical racial component in the structure and content of CTHD has 
not been apprehended in the considerable body of extant scholarship on the film’s transnational 
features and on the globalization of (Chinese) culture in general. I then restate my approach to the 
film as a response to much of this scholarship.7 In the subsequent section, I briefly touch upon the 
film’s popular and critical reception, followed by numerous examples of the film’s racial binarism. 
Finally, I conclude with an elaboration of what I believe to be the reasons for (and implications of) 
the appearance of such a racial8 logic in a 21st-century transnational Chinese-language film.
Global, Transnational, International: Imaging New Orientalisms
“Globalization”’ has replaced “modernization” as the new center 
of the Chinese cultural imagination.
—Fan Di’an9
Things and logic that we used to take for granted in the Orient 
might not be that logical today. It’s a good exam – how to tell a story 
with a global sense. That means more layout of the texture of society, 
more explanation of rules of the games.
—Ang Lee10 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon borrows a mythic sense of the 
7 My essay is a contribution and reply to the extant scholarship on the film, not a rejoinder. Among many scholarly 
treatments cited throughout, I am responding to Hsiao-hung Chang’s compelling argument that CTHD’s 
“transnational reception itself poses new challenging questions to the current discourse on globalization and asks for 
a radically new theorization of body imagination and power deployment.” See Chang Hsiao-hung, “The Unbearable 
Lightness of Globalization: On the Transnational Flight of Wuxia Film,” in ed. Darrel William Davis and Ru-shou 
Robert Chen, Cinema Taiwan: Politics, Popularity and the State of the Arts (London: Routledge, 2007), 105. I draw 
upon many other insightful analyses of the film below, where pertinent to stages and terms in my argument.
8 I shall be using race and ethnicity somewhat interchangeably throughout this essay, to refer to “perceived” 
physical, biological, or “attendant sociocultural differences” (Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 21, n2). 
See also, Duara’s discussion of the notion, established by Sun Yat-sen and others, that the “Han nation […] was 
the world’s most perfectly formed nation because the people were bound together by all five of the criteria that 
it took to form a nation: blood/race, language, custom, religion, and livelihood” (32).
9 Fan Di’an, “Synthi-scapes,” exhibition catalogue for the 50th Venice Biennale 2003, http://www.gdmoa.org/
english/exhibitions/50venice/fandian.htm (accessed Aug. 2004).
10 “The Guardian/NFT Interview: Ang Lee and James Schamus,” Guardian Unlimited (Nov. 7, 2000).
Chinese national to originate a new form of transnational and diasporic 
identity.
—Chris Berry and Mary Farquhar11 
Critics of global culture, or “the cultural logic of multinational capitalism,” as Žižek has 
facetiously called it, are frequently confronted with a powerful inertia in global cultural productions 
and politics. The greater the concretely experienced disruptions, inequalities, and marginalizing 
processes associated with (Western-originating) globalization, the more global citizens seek 
refuge in nostalgic and exotic images (often of non-Western cultures), images of the past in 
general, and nationalistic images. In parasitic fashion, the market created by the demand for such 
images has in turn become an integral part of the globalization process, sustaining such desires by 
keeping audiences fixated on images and narratives of everything but the socioeconomic realities 
of their own moment (and their own subjection and contribution to the monopolization of global 
resources and power in the hands of the few).12 In her effort to demystify and intervene in the 
rapid and relentless globalization of (Chinese) culture, Shih Shu-mei has noted how cinematic 
works, especially commercial films, have frequently catered to this market-driven desire via an 
Orientalist representational code that manipulates images and narratives of “Third World peoples” 
as mere “otherness machines” to “produce difference for exoticist consumption or managed 
multiculturalism,” as she has so aptly termed it.13 Media, cinema, and other representations 
continue to rely on a “consensus between the audience in the West and the Third World writer 
or director […] a contractual relation of mutual benefit and favor that works first to confirm the 
stereotyped knowledge of the audience and second to bring financial rewards to the makers of 
those cultural products.”14
11 Chris Berry, and Mary Farquhar, China on Screen: Cinema and Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), 11.
12 Arif Dirlik notes the ways that global culture can buttress cultural nationalism: “The culture industry […] 
contributes in the name of globalization to the reification of national traditions, which are commodified and 
relayed back to the people who claim them, further sharpening boundaries between such traditions.” See Arif 
Dirlik, “Culture against History? The Politics of East Asian Identity,” in ed. Ali Mirsepassi, Amrita Basu, and 
Frederic Weaver, Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World: Recasting the Area Studies Debate, 199.
13 Shih Shu-mei, “Global Literature and the Technologies of Recognition,” PMLA: Publications of the Modern 
Language Association of America 119.1 (2004): 21, 29, 28; emphasis added.
14 Ibid., 21. Shih unabashedly uses the term “Third World” in her recent work, where it stands for Chinese and other 
global “minorities” in this era of [unequal] globalization. I would qualify Shih’s formulation with Shiao-ying 
Shen’s argument that, where transnational film production, marketing, and spectatorship are concerned, “there 
is actually not much difference between the East and the West today […] Hollywood has already successfully 
interpellated the global film-viewing subject—shaping the film-viewing habit of audiences around the world” 
(cited in Lim Song Hwee, Celluloid Comrades: Representations of Male Homosexuality in Contemporary 
Chinese Cinemas [Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006], 22). Indeed, the global audience for Chinese 
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the mind and spirit, abandoning themselves to lust and impetuously acting on their emotional 
impulses.
Prior to presenting numerous examples of its racially dichotomized narrative structure, I 
will first contextualize CTHD with respect to discourses critical of globalization and its attendant 
cultural trends. I argue that this critical racial component in the structure and content of CTHD has 
not been apprehended in the considerable body of extant scholarship on the film’s transnational 
features and on the globalization of (Chinese) culture in general. I then restate my approach to the 
film as a response to much of this scholarship.7 In the subsequent section, I briefly touch upon the 
film’s popular and critical reception, followed by numerous examples of the film’s racial binarism. 
Finally, I conclude with an elaboration of what I believe to be the reasons for (and implications of) 
the appearance of such a racial8 logic in a 21st-century transnational Chinese-language film.
Global, Transnational, International: Imaging New Orientalisms
“Globalization”’ has replaced “modernization” as the new center 
of the Chinese cultural imagination.
—Fan Di’an9
Things and logic that we used to take for granted in the Orient 
might not be that logical today. It’s a good exam – how to tell a story 
with a global sense. That means more layout of the texture of society, 
more explanation of rules of the games.
—Ang Lee10 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon borrows a mythic sense of the 
7 My essay is a contribution and reply to the extant scholarship on the film, not a rejoinder. Among many scholarly 
treatments cited throughout, I am responding to Hsiao-hung Chang’s compelling argument that CTHD’s 
“transnational reception itself poses new challenging questions to the current discourse on globalization and asks for 
a radically new theorization of body imagination and power deployment.” See Chang Hsiao-hung, “The Unbearable 
Lightness of Globalization: On the Transnational Flight of Wuxia Film,” in ed. Darrel William Davis and Ru-shou 
Robert Chen, Cinema Taiwan: Politics, Popularity and the State of the Arts (London: Routledge, 2007), 105. I draw 
upon many other insightful analyses of the film below, where pertinent to stages and terms in my argument.
8 I shall be using race and ethnicity somewhat interchangeably throughout this essay, to refer to “perceived” 
physical, biological, or “attendant sociocultural differences” (Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 21, n2). 
See also, Duara’s discussion of the notion, established by Sun Yat-sen and others, that the “Han nation […] was 
the world’s most perfectly formed nation because the people were bound together by all five of the criteria that 
it took to form a nation: blood/race, language, custom, religion, and livelihood” (32).
9 Fan Di’an, “Synthi-scapes,” exhibition catalogue for the 50th Venice Biennale 2003, http://www.gdmoa.org/
english/exhibitions/50venice/fandian.htm (accessed Aug. 2004).
10 “The Guardian/NFT Interview: Ang Lee and James Schamus,” Guardian Unlimited (Nov. 7, 2000).
Chinese national to originate a new form of transnational and diasporic 
identity.
—Chris Berry and Mary Farquhar11 
Critics of global culture, or “the cultural logic of multinational capitalism,” as Žižek has 
facetiously called it, are frequently confronted with a powerful inertia in global cultural productions 
and politics. The greater the concretely experienced disruptions, inequalities, and marginalizing 
processes associated with (Western-originating) globalization, the more global citizens seek 
refuge in nostalgic and exotic images (often of non-Western cultures), images of the past in 
general, and nationalistic images. In parasitic fashion, the market created by the demand for such 
images has in turn become an integral part of the globalization process, sustaining such desires by 
keeping audiences fixated on images and narratives of everything but the socioeconomic realities 
of their own moment (and their own subjection and contribution to the monopolization of global 
resources and power in the hands of the few).12 In her effort to demystify and intervene in the 
rapid and relentless globalization of (Chinese) culture, Shih Shu-mei has noted how cinematic 
works, especially commercial films, have frequently catered to this market-driven desire via an 
Orientalist representational code that manipulates images and narratives of “Third World peoples” 
as mere “otherness machines” to “produce difference for exoticist consumption or managed 
multiculturalism,” as she has so aptly termed it.13 Media, cinema, and other representations 
continue to rely on a “consensus between the audience in the West and the Third World writer 
or director […] a contractual relation of mutual benefit and favor that works first to confirm the 
stereotyped knowledge of the audience and second to bring financial rewards to the makers of 
those cultural products.”14
11 Chris Berry, and Mary Farquhar, China on Screen: Cinema and Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), 11.
12 Arif Dirlik notes the ways that global culture can buttress cultural nationalism: “The culture industry […] 
contributes in the name of globalization to the reification of national traditions, which are commodified and 
relayed back to the people who claim them, further sharpening boundaries between such traditions.” See Arif 
Dirlik, “Culture against History? The Politics of East Asian Identity,” in ed. Ali Mirsepassi, Amrita Basu, and 
Frederic Weaver, Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World: Recasting the Area Studies Debate, 199.
13 Shih Shu-mei, “Global Literature and the Technologies of Recognition,” PMLA: Publications of the Modern 
Language Association of America 119.1 (2004): 21, 29, 28; emphasis added.
14 Ibid., 21. Shih unabashedly uses the term “Third World” in her recent work, where it stands for Chinese and other 
global “minorities” in this era of [unequal] globalization. I would qualify Shih’s formulation with Shiao-ying 
Shen’s argument that, where transnational film production, marketing, and spectatorship are concerned, “there 
is actually not much difference between the East and the West today […] Hollywood has already successfully 
interpellated the global film-viewing subject—shaping the film-viewing habit of audiences around the world” 
(cited in Lim Song Hwee, Celluloid Comrades: Representations of Male Homosexuality in Contemporary 
Chinese Cinemas [Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006], 22). Indeed, the global audience for Chinese 
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Shih’s rigorous critical perspective provides a clear path into the analysis and critique of 
global culture and transnational (Chinese) cinema in the 21st-century, for it allows us to interrogate 
the processes through which the production and success of a film like CTHD become possible. 
Shih’s framework first alerts us to the fact that, in the era of globalization of all media and images, 
to produce a Hollywood-style big-budget costume drama/action film for a transnational audience, 
set in the distant past (here, “ancient” China), is a supremely ideological move, whether intentional 
or not. By removing any reference to contemporary—or even modern—historical events and 
socioeconomic relations, Ang Lee has effectively guaranteed an anxiety-free experience for 
(Chinese and Western) audiences to reproduce their stereotyped knowledge of China, delighting 
in the film’s combination of dramatic fight scenes and romantic clichés, all set against a pseudo-
historical backdrop of traditional Chinese settings and locations.15 Lee, as cited above, knows that 
international audiences are necessary to recoup the production costs of an expensive transnational 
film. Consequently, he understands that such audiences are most easily lured with films that 
reaffirm the China they already know—(a simulacrum of) a premodern, exotic, mysterious 
and ancient China. Lee delivers these orientalist representational tropes in a form that has been 
likened by Lu to “homogenous, prepackaged cultural fast food to be effortlessly consumed by 
audiences from all over the world.”16 The formula is indeed quite palatable to both Western and 
Chinese audiences (across Asia and in the diaspora), who have responded enthusiastically to the 
film; Berry and Farquhar note, “[t]he film projects a mythic, cultural version of Chineseness for 
Chinese and non-Chinese audiences.”17 Among the former, much of the praise is couched in the 
rhetoric of ethnic and nationalistic pride,18 owing to the combination of the film’s “authentic” 
films now includes significant numbers of both Western and Chinese viewers, as evidenced in films such as 
CTHD, Ying Xiong 英雄 [Hero] (dir. Zhang Yimou 張藝謀, 2002), Shi mian mai fu 十面埋伏 [House of the 
Flying Daggers] (dir. Zhang Yimou, 2004), Huo Yuan Jia 霍元甲 [Fearless] (dir. Ronny Yu, 2006), and Kungfu 
功夫 [Kungfu Hustle] (dir. Stephen Chow, 2004).
15 Sheldon H. Lu witheringly remarks: “Paradoxically, the nonexistent imaginary old China as admittedly invented 
by [Ang] Lee is a dehistoricized, disembedded entity in the global commercial film market […] China in Lee’s 
film has become a shallow fantasy world, a wishful thinking, a stage for global entertainment. The seeming 
return to history and resort to national culture is a décor, a show, a contemporary spectacle.” See Lu, “Crouching 
Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 231.
16 Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 231.
17 Berry and Farquhar, China on Screen: Cinema and Nation, 69.
18 Lo Kwai-cheung similarly argues that some Chinese (“mainly Hong Kong”) popular films help to “constitut[e] an 
ethnic identity for diasporic Chinese communities and a distinct otherness for the western gaze.” See Lo Kwai-
Cheung, “There is No Such Thing as Asia: Racial Particularities in the ‘Asian’ Films of Hong Kong and Japan,” 
Modern Chinese Literature and Culture 17.1 (Spring 2005): 136. Ang Lee himself was concerned that he might 
be doing a disservice to the Chinese martial arts genre if “lao wei” 老外 (foreigners) were to perceive CTHD 
as a “B Movie.” See Hsieh Tsai-miao, Xunzhao qingmingjian: cong “Wohu canglong” tan huayu diangying 
guojihua 尋找青冥劍：從《臥虎藏龍》談華語電影國際化 [Searching for the Green Destiny: Crouching 
Chinese content with its success in the international Film Festival market (the film’s disputed 
success in the PRC is treated below), not to mention its garnering best film accolades at both the 
Hong Kong and Golden Horse Film Awards.
Lee’s transnationally-satisfying representational formula is one that includes: familiar 
characters and objects associated with traditional Chinese culture, Confucian social values,19 
architectural splendor, majestic landscapes, thrilling action sequences, and romantic storylines. 
This cinematic reproduction of “stereotyped knowledge” is of course, nothing new, displaying an 
essentialized, whitewashed, stylized, spectacular, glossy version of one’s local/national history 
and culture in the contemporary transnational mall of “unique local cultures” is a reliable strategy 
for mass marketing any film to an international audience.20 As Lee himself said, “you have 
to rediscover the old Chinese feeling in your memory and try to market it to a contemporary 
audience.”21
If the critiques of globalization and culture are valid with reference to CTHD, what exactly 
is it that makes this film more than just the latest iteration of Shih’s “managed multiculturalism”? 
Tiger, Hidden Dragon and the Internationalization of Chinese-language Cinema] (Taipei: Yatai Tushu, 2004). 
Also see Kenneth Chan for a thoughtful discussion of some Chinese viewers’ negative reactions to the film, and 
“what it means to be Chinese in the context of the Asian ‘invasion’ of Hollywood” (“The Global Return of the 
Wu Xia Pian,” 4). Chan observes that some Chinese viewers critical of the film react to it from a “nationalist/anti-
Orientalist” mindset, revealing a “cultural anxiety about identity and Chineseness in a globalized, postcolonial, 
and postmodern world order” (3-4).
19 See Shih Shu-Mei, “Globalisation and Minoritisation: Ang Lee and the Politics of Flexibility,” New Formations 
40 (2000): 86-101 for her insightful analysis of Ang Lee’s consistent cinematic conservatism and its relationship 
to Chinese audience needs. Kenneth Chan also foregrounds some of Lee’s patriarchal predilections in CTHD 
(Chan, “The Global Return of the Wu Xia Pian,” 10-14).
20 On spectatorship, see Lim for a discussion of Hollywood’s successful interpellation of “the global film-viewing 
subject” (Celluloid Comrades, 22). 
21 See Yu Sen-lun, “A director’s dream,” Taipei Times (Jul. 2, 2000), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/
archives/2000/07/02/42294, 17 (Accessed Jul. 18, 2007). Where only ten years ago, Hamid Naficy examined the 
(then-dominant) trend in which exilic “Third World” transnational filmmakers worked predominantly “outside the 
studio systems and the mainstream film industries of the host countries,” and produced largely dystopic visions 
of their home cultures in confrontation with the forces of globalization, with Ang Lee’s CTHD we confront the 
appropriation of émigré filmmakers by Hollywood, transnational marketing and production systems, and even 
cooptation of the filmmaker in producing “authentic” “national” film for the global market. See Hamid Naficy, 
“Phobic Spaces and Liminal Panics: Independent Transnational Film Genre,” in ed. Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, 
Multiculturalism, Postcoloniality, and Transnational Media (Rutgers: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 204-05; 
202-26. Sheldon H. Lu, citing another essay by Naficy, makes an argument similar to the current one, noting that 
“Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon allows us to reexamine the nature of a new type of film culture from the Third 
World,” one which lacks “the pathos of displacement, alienation, homelessness, and quest” (“Crouching Tiger, 
Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 222-23).
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Shih’s framework first alerts us to the fact that, in the era of globalization of all media and images, 
to produce a Hollywood-style big-budget costume drama/action film for a transnational audience, 
set in the distant past (here, “ancient” China), is a supremely ideological move, whether intentional 
or not. By removing any reference to contemporary—or even modern—historical events and 
socioeconomic relations, Ang Lee has effectively guaranteed an anxiety-free experience for 
(Chinese and Western) audiences to reproduce their stereotyped knowledge of China, delighting 
in the film’s combination of dramatic fight scenes and romantic clichés, all set against a pseudo-
historical backdrop of traditional Chinese settings and locations.15 Lee, as cited above, knows that 
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film. Consequently, he understands that such audiences are most easily lured with films that 
reaffirm the China they already know—(a simulacrum of) a premodern, exotic, mysterious 
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What makes CTHD unique, to the extent that Fran Martin, asks: “If the ‘Chineseness’ emphatically 
projected in this film reflects no social or historical reality but a self-conscious fabrication, —a 
form of simulacral Chineseness based on generic citation—then what, precisely, are the effects 
of the film’s wishful fantasy of ‘Chinese culture?’”22 Or, as Kenneth Chan more pointedly poses 
it: “[…] if the need to appeal to a Western gaze turns on self-Orientalism (as problematic and 
questionable as that is), what modes of self-ethnic ‘writing’ does Lee engage in […]?”23
Expanding on Shih’s insights and responding to Martin’s and Chan’s questions, this essay 
foregrounds the novel formula of cinematic “Chineseness” and “self-ethnic ‘writing’” that is 
possibly the most egregiously overlooked aspect in the extant scholarship on the film—its racial 
binarism. For CTHD’s familiar orientalist tropes appear within a novel representational scheme—a 
racialized exaltation of Han ethnicity, its traditions and social mores. This film is arguably the 
first globally successful Hollywood-style Chinese language film with a ubiquitous local/domestic 
racist logic as a key element of its narrative structure.24 All the main characters appear within a 
structured racial binarism that undergirds its transnational representational aesthetic (its managed 
multiculturalism). The deployment of race in CTHD thus represents a seminal variation on Shih’s 
notions of the global production of difference for exoticist consumption, the otherness machine, 
and the reproduction of stereotyped knowledge.25
22 Fran Martin, “The China Simulacrum: Genre, Feminism, and Pan-Chinese Cultural Politics in Crouching Tiger, 
Hidden Dragon,” in ed. Chris Berry and Lu Feii, Island on the Edge: Taiwan New Cinema and After (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 158.
23 Chan, “The Global Return of the Wu Xia Pian,” 6.
24 Although my effort here is to bring to light a rather unfortunate—and, I gather, unintentional—aspect of this film, 
I nonetheless must nod my head in agreement with Fran Martin’s argument about the multicoded meanings of 
CTHD and other films, where she states: “in the era of cultural globalization, films that aim to be accessible and 
appealing to multiple, distinct audiences may more or less intentionally encode multiple possible interpretations 
at the moment of production; interpretations that can then be picked up selectively by differently positioned 
audiences.” See Fran Martin, “Taiwan (trans)national Cinema: the Far-flung Adventures of a Taiwanese Tomboy,” 
in ed. Darrel William Davis and Ru-shou Robert Chen, Cinema Taiwan: Politics, Popularity and the State of 
the Arts, 141. I also feel redeemed in pursuing this angle by James Schamus’s generous, erudite, and remarkably 
candid response to two academic interpretations of the film. Schamus not only challenges all interpretations of 
the film to ask: “[…] if the idea of Chineseness [in CTHD] is centralizing, what is its own center? Is it ‘official’ 
Han nationality, proprietary Manchu power, or a multiethnic gathering of the Chinese minzu, the ‘people’?” 
He even goes so far as to pronounce it a “more than dubious” “fantasy” for anyone to aver that CTHD “is so 
politically correct that it has somehow miraculously escaped any deep trafficking with the powers that be,” 
and avoided “hidden complicities with hegemonic social orders.” See James Schamus, “Aesthetic Identities: A 
Response to Kenneth Chan and Christina Klein,” Cinema Journal 43.4 (Summer 2004): 45, 47.
25 Todd McGowan argues that all films “internally posit their own spectators,” the main “task of interpretation” 
being to locate the response that this positing demands. See Todd McGowan, The Impossible David Lynch 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 23. The spectator posited by CTHD is one who will subliminally 
Before proceeding to the examples and analysis of the racial binarism structuring the film, I 
will briefly touch upon the film’s popular reception.
Oscar and Cannes: “China” on the Red Carpet
CTHD received a standing ovation at the 2000 Cannes Film Festival, garnered four of the 
ten Oscar Awards for which it was nominated,26 and was well-received by audiences around the 
globe. The producers, cinematographers, actors, musicians, stunt crew, and others involved with 
the film comprise a veritable who’s who of entertainment industry heavy hitters in China, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan; Japan, Malaysia, and America are represented in the film’s production as 
well.27 It is, as Sheldon H. Lu notes, “a quintessential example of global cinema.”28 While there 
has been some debate over the film’s popular and box-office success in the PRC,29 legal and 
pirated DVD, VCD, and VHS sales have been strong, especially since Cannes and the Oscars. 
The film is now the top-grossing foreign-language film of all time (in American and elsewhere), 
having dethroned Roberto Beningi’s La vita è bella (Life is Beautiful, 1997). In the United States 
and Canada, the film received the widest release of any subtitled movie in history, and to date has 
consume the film’s validation of an essentialistic Han ethnicity and debasement of non-Han minorities, and the 
response demanded is this essay’s exposure of the film’s racialized subtext.
26 For Best Foreign Film, Best Cinematography, Best Original Score, and Best Art Direction; the film also garnered 
6 other nominations that it did not win, including Best Film and Best Director. It is the first Asian film ever 
nominated for Best Picture.
27 For a cornucopia of facts and statistics on the film, in addition to Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing 
Angels,” see Martin, “The China Simulacrum,” 149-59; Jennifer W. Jay, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon’: 
(Re)packaging Chinas and Selling the Hybridized Culture and Identity in an Age of Globalization,” in ed. Ng 
Maria N. and Philip Holden, Reading Chinese Transnationalisms: Society, Literature, Film (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2006), 131-42; Felicia Chan, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Cultural Migrancy and 
Translatability,” in ed. Chris Berry, Chinese Films in Focus: 25 New Takes (London: British Film Institute, 2003), 
56-64; Sunshine, ed., Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Portrait of the Ang Lee Film.
28 Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 231. Lu notes observe “the politics of labeling, 
naming, and categorizing [this film] becomes messy and murky,” owing to the unprecedented nature of this film 
as “a classic example of global cinema in the age of globalization.” (221-22).
29 See Lu for a brief discussion and survey of the literature surrounding the contested degree of success the film 
had (or didn’t) with Chinese-speaking audiences in Asia (“Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 
227, 232 n9, and passim). See also Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh’s response to the negative reception of the film, where 
she foregrounds its overlooked wenyi elements, including “the interior, feminine, and the Confucian.” See Emilie 
Yueh-yu Yeh, “The Road Home: Stylistic Renovations of Chinese Mandarin Classics,” in ed. Darrel William 
Davis and Ru-shou Robert Chen, Cinema Taiwan: Politics, Popularity and the State of the Arts, 204. Berry and 
Farquhar discuss Wen 文 together with Wu 武, drawing on the work of Kam Louie (China on Screen: Cinema 
and Nation, 140-43; 200). 
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22 Fran Martin, “The China Simulacrum: Genre, Feminism, and Pan-Chinese Cultural Politics in Crouching Tiger, 
Hidden Dragon,” in ed. Chris Berry and Lu Feii, Island on the Edge: Taiwan New Cinema and After (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 158.
23 Chan, “The Global Return of the Wu Xia Pian,” 6.
24 Although my effort here is to bring to light a rather unfortunate—and, I gather, unintentional—aspect of this film, 
I nonetheless must nod my head in agreement with Fran Martin’s argument about the multicoded meanings of 
CTHD and other films, where she states: “in the era of cultural globalization, films that aim to be accessible and 
appealing to multiple, distinct audiences may more or less intentionally encode multiple possible interpretations 
at the moment of production; interpretations that can then be picked up selectively by differently positioned 
audiences.” See Fran Martin, “Taiwan (trans)national Cinema: the Far-flung Adventures of a Taiwanese Tomboy,” 
in ed. Darrel William Davis and Ru-shou Robert Chen, Cinema Taiwan: Politics, Popularity and the State of 
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Response to Kenneth Chan and Christina Klein,” Cinema Journal 43.4 (Summer 2004): 45, 47.
25 Todd McGowan argues that all films “internally posit their own spectators,” the main “task of interpretation” 
being to locate the response that this positing demands. See Todd McGowan, The Impossible David Lynch 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 23. The spectator posited by CTHD is one who will subliminally 
Before proceeding to the examples and analysis of the racial binarism structuring the film, I 
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Oscar and Cannes: “China” on the Red Carpet
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globe. The producers, cinematographers, actors, musicians, stunt crew, and others involved with 
the film comprise a veritable who’s who of entertainment industry heavy hitters in China, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan; Japan, Malaysia, and America are represented in the film’s production as 
well.27 It is, as Sheldon H. Lu notes, “a quintessential example of global cinema.”28 While there 
has been some debate over the film’s popular and box-office success in the PRC,29 legal and 
pirated DVD, VCD, and VHS sales have been strong, especially since Cannes and the Oscars. 
The film is now the top-grossing foreign-language film of all time (in American and elsewhere), 
having dethroned Roberto Beningi’s La vita è bella (Life is Beautiful, 1997). In the United States 
and Canada, the film received the widest release of any subtitled movie in history, and to date has 
consume the film’s validation of an essentialistic Han ethnicity and debasement of non-Han minorities, and the 
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26 For Best Foreign Film, Best Cinematography, Best Original Score, and Best Art Direction; the film also garnered 
6 other nominations that it did not win, including Best Film and Best Director. It is the first Asian film ever 
nominated for Best Picture.
27 For a cornucopia of facts and statistics on the film, in addition to Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing 
Angels,” see Martin, “The China Simulacrum,” 149-59; Jennifer W. Jay, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon’: 
(Re)packaging Chinas and Selling the Hybridized Culture and Identity in an Age of Globalization,” in ed. Ng 
Maria N. and Philip Holden, Reading Chinese Transnationalisms: Society, Literature, Film (Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 2006), 131-42; Felicia Chan, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Cultural Migrancy and 
Translatability,” in ed. Chris Berry, Chinese Films in Focus: 25 New Takes (London: British Film Institute, 2003), 
56-64; Sunshine, ed., Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Portrait of the Ang Lee Film.
28 Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 231. Lu notes observe “the politics of labeling, 
naming, and categorizing [this film] becomes messy and murky,” owing to the unprecedented nature of this film 
as “a classic example of global cinema in the age of globalization.” (221-22).
29 See Lu for a brief discussion and survey of the literature surrounding the contested degree of success the film 
had (or didn’t) with Chinese-speaking audiences in Asia (“Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 
227, 232 n9, and passim). See also Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh’s response to the negative reception of the film, where 
she foregrounds its overlooked wenyi elements, including “the interior, feminine, and the Confucian.” See Emilie 
Yueh-yu Yeh, “The Road Home: Stylistic Renovations of Chinese Mandarin Classics,” in ed. Darrel William 
Davis and Ru-shou Robert Chen, Cinema Taiwan: Politics, Popularity and the State of the Arts, 204. Berry and 
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grossed more than 60 million dollars in America.
As this film has grown in popularity and in international critical recognition, audiences, 
critics, journalists, politicians, presidents, hip-hop artists, film artists, to name a few, have 
almost universally praised CTHD. Despite disputes over its success among Chinese martial 
arts film aficionados and Mainland audiences, some of the highest praise for the film has come 
from mainland Chinese and Hong Kong residents,30 as well as Taiwanese, most of whom tout 
what the film has done for the Chinese people and the Chinese film industries. After the film’s 
unprecedented success in the West, “centers of the Chinese-speaking world basked in a moment 
of glory.”31 The People’s Daily quoted Lee’s remarks that the “Chinese people” contributed to 
the making of the film, that “all ethnic Chinese throughout the world” should share its success, 
and that CTHD Oscar winners include Chinese “from all sides [who] have succeeded in showing 
Chinese culture and glories to people all over the world.”32 Taiwan-born director Ang Lee was 
called a “credit to all Chinese people”33 and lauded for the boost he’d given the Chinese film 
industry (the film even reportedly inspired Zhang Yimou 張藝謀 to make his first big-budget 
historical martial arts film, Ying Xiong 英雄 [Hero, 2002]). As Fran Martin has noted, “Crouching 
Tiger is made to signify ‘Chineseness’ as the rediscovered cultural identity of the film’s director, 
the generic ‘homecoming’ of the film paralleling the geographic homecoming of its director.”34 
Finally, the film has been credited with giving Chinese movies “a better opportunity to enter the 
American market” and bringing honor “to Chinese people all over the world.”35 Both the former 
President of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁, and Taiwan’s Premier, Chang Chung-hsiung 張俊
雄, personally congratulated Lee for promoting and bringing glory to Taiwan and Chinese culture, 
30 The film was nominated for 16 and won 8 awards at the 20th Hong Kong Film awards in 2001.
31 Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 220.
32 See Du Minghua, “Glory of ‘Crouching Tiger’ Belongs to All Chinese: Ang Lee,” People’s Daily English 
online version (Mar. 28, 2001), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/English/200103/28/eng20010328_66220.html 
(accessed Jul. 17, 2007). Cinematographer Peter Pau, in his Oscar speech, also declared the honor that the film 
brought to himself, “the people of Hong Kong and to Chinese people all over the world.” See “‘Crouching 
Tiger’ Wins Third Award,” People’s Daily English online version (Mar. 26, 2001), http://english.peopledaily.
com.cn/english/200103/26/eng20010326_65997. html (accessed Jul. 17, 2007). For more glowing praise of the 
film in a journal marketed to a global Chinese readership, see Wu Qixing, “Zhonghua minzhu de yishu jiejing” 
中華民族的藝術結晶 [“Chinese People’s Art Produces a Gem”], Asiaweek 亞洲週刊 (Apr. 2-8, 2001): 34; 
Wu Qixing, and Wang Yunyi, “Wohu zanglong zhan qi lai le” 臥虎藏龍站起來了 [“Crouching Tiger Hidden 
Dragon Stands Up”], Asiaweek 亞洲週刊 (Apr. 2-8, 2001): 30-33.
33 Cited in Chan, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Cultural Migrancy and Translatability,” 58. These and other 
instances of cultural pride in the film confirm its substantial contribution to pan-Chinese cultural nationalism and 
Jameson’s notion of “neo-ethnicity.” See Frederic Jameson, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the 
World System (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 117.
34 Martin, “The China Simulacrum,” 151.
35 Chan, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Cultural Migrancy and Translatability,” 58.
as did many Taiwan citizens.36 While the content, global popularity, and box-office success of 
CTHD inspired an upswell of ethnic pride and cultural nationalist sentiment, it did not give rise 
to any serious discussions of the unequal and biased representations of Han Chinese versus non-
Han minorities in the film.
The Felial and the Feral
I identify more with Li Mubai [李慕白] and Yu Xiulien [俞秀蓮]. 
That’s the kind of person I am—reasonable and a team player type. 
(Laughs) A normal person who is a good citizen, becoming a role model, 
and taking responsibility for his actions.
The promise that wuxia makes to the Asian audience […] is a 
fantasy of power, romance, and morality.
—Ang Lee37
Though employing a number of exotic and orientalist representational tropes, the 
“Chineseness” of CTHD sheds familiar trappings of a passive, orientalized, feminized, or 
otherwise subalternized other. In co-writer James Schamus’ words “[t]his movie is more about 
inner strength and centeredness.”38 But Chinese strength and self-assuredness in this film do 
not manifest themselves in familiar nationalist narratives of resistance to external threats, nor 
do they imaginatively redress historical injustices or political inequalities. As Sheldon H. Lu 
has noted, where “nationality and the nation-state are often perceived as a menacing, demonic 
entity,” CTHD, produced in the cultural cuisinart of global commercial film, has detached 
nationality and ethnicity from “any sense of serious grounding in history and national(ist) politics 
in an increasingly borderless world.”39 Yet contrary to Lu’s concomitant assertion that a film 
like CTHD presents a “deterritorialized” and “harmless, nonthreatening, and benign” version 
of Chinese “culture/ethnicity” to global spectators, CTHD does not “detach” itself from those 
once-“menacing” ethnic/nationalistic tensions. Instead, it internalizes and localizes them in a way 
that renegotiates China’s image in the global popular imagination.40 Rather than inscribing itself 
36 For numerous quotations and a contextualization of these and other accolades heaped upon CTHD, see Chan, 
“Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Cultural Migrancy and Translatability.”
37 Cited in Berry, “Ang Lee: Freedom in Film,” 343; David Chute, “Year of the Dragon,” Premier (December 
2000): 77.
38 Sunshine, ed., Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Portrait of the Ang Lee Film, 42.
39 Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 230-31.
40 See Lim for a more sanguine view of Ang Lee’s cinematic corpus and cinema as a “socially discursive act in 
itself,” and the ways that “minority groups and mainstream culture” interact and mutually affect one another in 
cross-cultural and inter-cultural cinematic representations (Celluloid Comrades, 66-68). Significantly, CTHD is 
absent from the list of Ang Lee films that Lim cites over the course of his argument.
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within “serious” national and historical narratives, the image of a powerful and grounded China 
here takes on a new guise, the patriarchal dominator and subduer of domestic chaotic otherness in 
an intra-asian racializing dynamic. Han Chinese (and Han China, by clear implication) in CTHD 
appear as the masterful and martial upholders of social stability, humanism, and transcendent 
pacific values. This racializing representational scheme in fact reverses much of the orientalist 
imagery of an ancient, dynastic, imperial, passive, and feminized China that has for so long 
been a staple of the global cultural imagination. Far from being a passive object of imperial, 
colonial, or global processes, the Han race in CTHD (interchangeable with “China” and “the 
Chinese” in the greater Chinese and global imaginary) is represented as a stern and noble subject, 
in repeated contrast to their inferior racial others.41 The racial schematic in this film helps to 
jettison accumulated orientalist baggage, such images of China the weak and acquiescing, China 
the obsequious, China the backward, China the subaltern, or China providing the tea at the table 
of great nations.42 Instead, the Han Chinese and China represent the dynamic martial pacifist, 
peacekeeper, bodyguard, spiritual master, and symbol of all that is civil and law abiding.43 
CTHD’s China is possessed of a vigorous Confucian-informed agency that deftly handles all 
internal disruptions to the status quo, which it is bent on preserving.44
41 There is arguably also the implication that the Han in this film are the repository of all the physical vigor, “inner 
strength,” ethics, morality, spirituality, and civility the West has left behind in its crass rush into the industrial age, 
modernity, now post-industrialism, and now neo-imperialism.
42 Emerson famously wrote: “But China, reverend dullness! hoary ideot!, all she can say at the convocation of 
nations must be—‘I made the tea’” (1824). See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Journal & Miscellaneous Notebooks, 
entry dated 1824, cited in Paul Cohen, China Unbound: Evolving Perspectives on the Chinese Past (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 49.
43 At the risk of complicating my own argument, I would here add that, in the global orientalist imaginary, Tibet 
(since at least 1937, when Lost Horizon [dir. Frank Capra] was released) holds the status of noblest Other to the 
modern West. Perhaps this is one of the subtle but insidious allegorical associations that transnational viewers 
of CTHD are encouraged to make, to see the Han in the film as the new image of Asian spiritual authority 
and magnanimity, thereby undermining Tibet’s exclusive claim to the same. As stated earlier (see note 25), I 
do not believe that this is the result of a conscious or deliberate representational strategy on the part of the 
director or scriptwriters. Rather, it is indicative of the kind of multicoding of films with numerous potential 
interpretations that occurs “in the era of cultural globalization.” (Martin, “Taiwan (trans)national Cinema,” 
141). See also Ulf Hedetoft’s teasing out of the factors at work in “the push-and-pull dialectic between national 
identities and cultural globalization […] forms of tension between its [contemporary cinema’s] transnational 
forms of production, dissemination, and (sometimes) contents, and its routinely national modes of reception, 
decoding and interpretation, based on national identities, cultural history, and aesthetic traditions.” See Hedetoft, 
“Contemporary Cinema: Between Cultural Globalization and National Interpretation,” in ed. Mette Hjort and 
Scott MacKenzie, Cinema and Nation (London: Routledge, 2000), 278-79.
44 This dynamic partakes only partially of some common paradigms in Qing chivalric fiction, where the “co-
optation of roving knights by the political establishment is a common occurrence […] Especially in the hybrid 
Those disruptions are perpetrated by domestic non-Han ethnic minorities, not by stock 
wuxia film antagonists—feuding temple loyalists, scheming imperial advisors, eunuch intriguers, 
defamers of the nation, abusers of the poor and weak, or those single-mindedly pursuing 
vengeance.45 Which exact contemporary ethnic or national other these (historically remote) 
Manchu and Turkestanish racial others might symbolically or allegorically represent is relatively 
unimportant; their function is to serve as a dramatic counterpart against whose presence a far more 
civilized, prudent, non-violent, and munificent Chinese race can display its physical, spiritual, 
ethical, emotional, familial, and social superiority.46
The image of a magnanimous, supremely civilized Han race is manifested in this film 
not via established wuxia film conventions, but through a consistent racial dichotomy at the 
representational level. Where the racialized/ethnicized villains of Chinese martial arts films in 
the past have often been Japanese or Western imperialist bullies, the racialized villain in CTHD is 
a barbaric Asian other within China’s borders. Furthermore, what is most unique about the film is 
its conflation of illegality, incivility, social and sexual impropriety with China’s ethnic minorities. 
Not only does the film consistently associate deviation from conservative mores, social propriety, 
and sexual chastity with non-Han ethnic minorities,47 it leads viewers to the conclusion that such 
genre, chivalric-tales-cum-detective-stories (xiayi gongan xiaoshuo 俠義公案小說), [where] fearless heroes 
cooperate with an upright official to eliminate criminals and uphold the status quo, instead of defying imperial 
rule” (Tze-Lan Deborah Sang, unpublished manuscript).
45 Or some version of indigenous Chinese spirituality and martial ethics gone awry, e.g. the evil Daoist, Lamaist, 
and Buddhist individuals/sects who have betrayed their culture and turned ancient Chinese physical, mental, and 
spiritual training to evil ends.
46 Viewer’s association with the racially superior Han heroes might be the true “choice of identificatory points of 
view,” “cross-identi[fication],” and “allo-identification […] with an image of an ‘other’” offered by the film, as 
interpreted by Martin in “The China Simulacrum Martin,” 153-54, and passim.
47 Around 55 ethnic minorities are officially recognized by the PRC government. The Han, at around 91% of 
the total population, are the vast majority. Two of these minorities are prominently featured in the film: the 
Manchu and the minorities of Turkestan 新疆. The latter are a mostly Islamic population residing atop China’s 
largest reservoirs of fossil fuel reserves, and who arguably represent the greatest contemporary racial threat 
to domestic socio-economic stability. For analyses of discourse and politics of race, ethnicity, and identity in 
China, see: Wu David Yen-ho, “The Construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese Identities,” in ed. Susan D. Blum 
and Lionel M. Jensen, China Off Center: Mapping the Margins of the Middle Kingdom (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press, 2002), 167-82; Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992); Anne Csete, “China’s Ethnicities: State Ideology and Policy in Historical Perspective,” 
in ed. Grant Cornwell and Eve Stoddard, Global Multiculturalism: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity, Race 
and Nation (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 287-307; Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, 
Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Pamela Kyle Crossley, 
A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000); Pamela Kyle Crossley, et al., eds., Empire at the Margins: Culture Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early 
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modern West. Perhaps this is one of the subtle but insidious allegorical associations that transnational viewers 
of CTHD are encouraged to make, to see the Han in the film as the new image of Asian spiritual authority 
and magnanimity, thereby undermining Tibet’s exclusive claim to the same. As stated earlier (see note 25), I 
do not believe that this is the result of a conscious or deliberate representational strategy on the part of the 
director or scriptwriters. Rather, it is indicative of the kind of multicoding of films with numerous potential 
interpretations that occurs “in the era of cultural globalization.” (Martin, “Taiwan (trans)national Cinema,” 
141). See also Ulf Hedetoft’s teasing out of the factors at work in “the push-and-pull dialectic between national 
identities and cultural globalization […] forms of tension between its [contemporary cinema’s] transnational 
forms of production, dissemination, and (sometimes) contents, and its routinely national modes of reception, 
decoding and interpretation, based on national identities, cultural history, and aesthetic traditions.” See Hedetoft, 
“Contemporary Cinema: Between Cultural Globalization and National Interpretation,” in ed. Mette Hjort and 
Scott MacKenzie, Cinema and Nation (London: Routledge, 2000), 278-79.
44 This dynamic partakes only partially of some common paradigms in Qing chivalric fiction, where the “co-
optation of roving knights by the political establishment is a common occurrence […] Especially in the hybrid 
Those disruptions are perpetrated by domestic non-Han ethnic minorities, not by stock 
wuxia film antagonists—feuding temple loyalists, scheming imperial advisors, eunuch intriguers, 
defamers of the nation, abusers of the poor and weak, or those single-mindedly pursuing 
vengeance.45 Which exact contemporary ethnic or national other these (historically remote) 
Manchu and Turkestanish racial others might symbolically or allegorically represent is relatively 
unimportant; their function is to serve as a dramatic counterpart against whose presence a far more 
civilized, prudent, non-violent, and munificent Chinese race can display its physical, spiritual, 
ethical, emotional, familial, and social superiority.46
The image of a magnanimous, supremely civilized Han race is manifested in this film 
not via established wuxia film conventions, but through a consistent racial dichotomy at the 
representational level. Where the racialized/ethnicized villains of Chinese martial arts films in 
the past have often been Japanese or Western imperialist bullies, the racialized villain in CTHD is 
a barbaric Asian other within China’s borders. Furthermore, what is most unique about the film is 
its conflation of illegality, incivility, social and sexual impropriety with China’s ethnic minorities. 
Not only does the film consistently associate deviation from conservative mores, social propriety, 
and sexual chastity with non-Han ethnic minorities,47 it leads viewers to the conclusion that such 
genre, chivalric-tales-cum-detective-stories (xiayi gongan xiaoshuo 俠義公案小說), [where] fearless heroes 
cooperate with an upright official to eliminate criminals and uphold the status quo, instead of defying imperial 
rule” (Tze-Lan Deborah Sang, unpublished manuscript).
45 Or some version of indigenous Chinese spirituality and martial ethics gone awry, e.g. the evil Daoist, Lamaist, 
and Buddhist individuals/sects who have betrayed their culture and turned ancient Chinese physical, mental, and 
spiritual training to evil ends.
46 Viewer’s association with the racially superior Han heroes might be the true “choice of identificatory points of 
view,” “cross-identi[fication],” and “allo-identification […] with an image of an ‘other’” offered by the film, as 
interpreted by Martin in “The China Simulacrum Martin,” 153-54, and passim.
47 Around 55 ethnic minorities are officially recognized by the PRC government. The Han, at around 91% of 
the total population, are the vast majority. Two of these minorities are prominently featured in the film: the 
Manchu and the minorities of Turkestan 新疆. The latter are a mostly Islamic population residing atop China’s 
largest reservoirs of fossil fuel reserves, and who arguably represent the greatest contemporary racial threat 
to domestic socio-economic stability. For analyses of discourse and politics of race, ethnicity, and identity in 
China, see: Wu David Yen-ho, “The Construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese Identities,” in ed. Susan D. Blum 
and Lionel M. Jensen, China Off Center: Mapping the Margins of the Middle Kingdom (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press, 2002), 167-82; Frank Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992); Anne Csete, “China’s Ethnicities: State Ideology and Policy in Historical Perspective,” 
in ed. Grant Cornwell and Eve Stoddard, Global Multiculturalism: Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity, Race 
and Nation (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 287-307; Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, 
Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Pamela Kyle Crossley, 
A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000); Pamela Kyle Crossley, et al., eds., Empire at the Margins: Culture Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early 
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violations are synonymous with personal suffering and social unrest. This consistent logic of racial 
binarism that structures the film, a subtext underlying the film’s “decipherable localism,”48 has 
been overlooked in all the hype surrounding the international popularity, film festival accolades, 
and box office success of CTHD, and remains essentially unaddressed in the scholarly work 
on the film, which has been otherwise lucid in dissecting the global/transnational elements and 
implications of the film’s production and reception.49 To reiterate, the rigid logic of racial binarism 
I am referring to takes the form of multiple parallel scenes in which ethnic Chinese, the “Han” 
race, are favorably contrasted to non-Han races, and the non-Hans are negatively portrayed.
Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Gang Zhao, “Reinventing China: Imperial Qing 
Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century,” Modern China 
32.1 (2006): 3-30. See also essays in Eric P. Kaufmann, Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant 
Minorities (London: Routledge, 2004). For analyses of the largely exoticizing representation of ethnic minorities 
in Chinese films, see Paul Clark, “Ethnic Minorities in Chinese Films: Cinema and the Exotic,” East-West Film 
Journal 1.2 (Jun. 1987): 15-31; Chris Berry, “‘Race’ ([min] [zu]): Chinese Film and the Politics of Nationalism,” 
Cinema Journal 31.2 (Winter 1992): 45-58; and Zhang Yingjin, “From ‘Minority Film’ to ‘Minority Discourse’: 
Questions of Nationhood and Ethnicity in Chinese Cinema,” Cinema Journal 31.2 (Winter 1992): 73-90.
48 Shih coins this term to refer to the ways that the “minoritised” must package “the presentation of local national 
culture” in order for it to be readily understood and consumed by a “non-local audience.” See Shih, “Globalisation 
and Minoritisation,” 100. Jay views this process from an opposite perspective, arguing that a “transnational” film 
like CTHD “despite being Westernized and hybridized, retains its Chinese identity and culture in the eyes of 
the global film audience.” See Jay, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon’: (Re)packaging Chinas and Selling the 
Hybridized Culture and Identity in an Age of Globalization,” 142.
49 Kenneth Chan is one author who has paid significant attention to the representations of race in the film, which 
he condenses under “the binary logic of [the] social responsibility [Han characters] versus personal freedom 
[non-Han characters]” (Chan, “The Global Return of the Wu Xia Pian,” 9). Contra the current reading, Chan 
perceptively finds political implications in this binarism, linking the representation of non-Han minorities in 
the film to Ang Lee’s perceived and salutary attempt to “unpack[s] Han hegemony in his formulation of a 
Chinese national imaginary,” which also “provides a political metaphor for the Chinese government’s role in the 
marginalization and oppression of recalcitrant ethnic minorities and territorial enclaves” as well as “a trope for 
the conflict the Taiwanese people face in confronting the larger national issue of Taiwan’s political reunification 
with mainland China” (Chan, “The Global Return of the Wu Xia Pian,” 10). Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh has likewise 
perceived a binarism in the representation of the two couples, which she interprets not racially, but as Ang Lee’s 
effort to “contain these problems by juxtaposing wenyi 文藝 and wuxia 武俠 and creating a tight synergy of 
these two styles” (“The Road Home,” 204). Yeh and Davis discuss the organization of characters along “binaries” 
and the consequent “binarization and structural simplicity” of the film, but do not list race/ethnicity among the 
“themes” these simple binaries are designed to convey to a “world audience” (Yeh and Davis, Taiwan Film 
Directors: A Treasure Island, 197). Jay finds the film to represent an “inclusionist China of blurred ethnicities.” 
See Jay, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon’: (Re)packaging Chinas and Selling the Hybridized Culture and 
Identity in an Age of Globalization,” 136.
Han Chinese are the film’s “role models,” in Ang Lee’s words, models of social conformity, 
displaying unswerving obedience to the government [Qing-Manchu50] and its laws, observing 
social mores, and upholding the patriarchal ethical codes of the jianghu brotherhood.51 Even in 
private, the Han heroes struggle to adhere to conservative social norms governing gender and 
sexual relations, and remain chaste in exchange for a higher, mystical, spiritual union that will 
apparently come in the afterlife. Their sexual propriety and celibacy are implicitly linked to 
their superior martial arts techniques, development of the mind-spirit complex being morally 
superior to any pleasures of the flesh and the key to proper training for righteous martial combat. 
Within the racially superior Han, there is an additional gender hierarchy as well: the Han hero, Li 
Mubai, is by racial and gender default the most physically, morally, and spiritually adept of all the 
characters. No woman will ever reach his level.52
Non-Han characters, on the other hand, are violators of the social, juridical, and familial 
codes, laws, mores, and values dear to the Han characters. In contrast to the civilized Han, they 
50 Ironically, a notable feature in CTHD and numerous other martial arts films is, for lack of a better term, the 
“Ah-Q postcolonialism” that is manifested in the representation of the Manchu colonization as a triumphal era of 
Han ethnicity and culture (and in related phenomena, such as cinematic treatments of the Opium War or the 2006 
PRC celebrations of Genghis Khan as a Chinese hero).
51 See Oriental Films, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon: An Interview with Ang Lee and James Schamus.” 
“Jianghu 江湖 encompasses an abstract community within the Chinese literary tradition that is ruled not by 
state legislation but by moral principle and decorum […] Its members are not above the state laws, but are 
accorded the moral authority to reject the implementation of those law should they serve corrupt ends. Crouching 
Tiger is sustained by the tension between the various characters and their varying abilities to adhere to jianghu 
principles.” See Chan, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Cultural Migrancy and Translatability,” 59. In the 
diegetic, the emphasis on Confucian “moral principle and decorum” across civil society and the jianghu world 
is in no way counterbalanced by a Buddhist ethic or “Taoist sensibility” (Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, 
Bouncing Angels,” 225) associated with the Wudan or other martial arts schools (Jay, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden 
Dragon’: (Re)packaging Chinas and Selling the Hybridized Culture and Identity in an Age of Globalization,” 
137). In fact, it is implied that the non-Han female characters’ (Jade-eyed Fox and Yu Jialong 玉嬌龍) ignorance 
and impulsive and selfish violations of (patriarchal) Confucian mores and civil laws and the Han ethical codes 
of the jianghu are precisely what keeps them from mastering the Wudan style. See Chow Kenny Ka-nin, “Hong 
Kong Animation: The Uncanny Brush in Wuxia film,” Asian Cinema 18.1 (Spring/Summer 2007): 138-49 for 
a recent concise history of the term wuxia. From a more syncretic perspective, one might say that Li Mubai’s 
combination of Confucian/Jianghu ethics and Chinese Taoist “stillness” and mysticism further elevates him 
above both the non-Han characters and Shu-lien.
52 Chan avers: “Each character has a social role to play within this world, and the gender relations depicted in the 
film are but part of this larger framework. There is no direct evidence of male oppression in the film other than 
the one we are primed to expect from the period setting of ancient China” (“Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: 
Cultural Migrancy and Translatability,” 61). While I find the film quite conservative where gender is concerned, 
I do not have space in the present essay to address this issue in detail.
30 31
violations are synonymous with personal suffering and social unrest. This consistent logic of racial 
binarism that structures the film, a subtext underlying the film’s “decipherable localism,”48 has 
been overlooked in all the hype surrounding the international popularity, film festival accolades, 
and box office success of CTHD, and remains essentially unaddressed in the scholarly work 
on the film, which has been otherwise lucid in dissecting the global/transnational elements and 
implications of the film’s production and reception.49 To reiterate, the rigid logic of racial binarism 
I am referring to takes the form of multiple parallel scenes in which ethnic Chinese, the “Han” 
race, are favorably contrasted to non-Han races, and the non-Hans are negatively portrayed.
Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Gang Zhao, “Reinventing China: Imperial Qing 
Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century,” Modern China 
32.1 (2006): 3-30. See also essays in Eric P. Kaufmann, Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant 
Minorities (London: Routledge, 2004). For analyses of the largely exoticizing representation of ethnic minorities 
in Chinese films, see Paul Clark, “Ethnic Minorities in Chinese Films: Cinema and the Exotic,” East-West Film 
Journal 1.2 (Jun. 1987): 15-31; Chris Berry, “‘Race’ ([min] [zu]): Chinese Film and the Politics of Nationalism,” 
Cinema Journal 31.2 (Winter 1992): 45-58; and Zhang Yingjin, “From ‘Minority Film’ to ‘Minority Discourse’: 
Questions of Nationhood and Ethnicity in Chinese Cinema,” Cinema Journal 31.2 (Winter 1992): 73-90.
48 Shih coins this term to refer to the ways that the “minoritised” must package “the presentation of local national 
culture” in order for it to be readily understood and consumed by a “non-local audience.” See Shih, “Globalisation 
and Minoritisation,” 100. Jay views this process from an opposite perspective, arguing that a “transnational” film 
like CTHD “despite being Westernized and hybridized, retains its Chinese identity and culture in the eyes of 
the global film audience.” See Jay, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon’: (Re)packaging Chinas and Selling the 
Hybridized Culture and Identity in an Age of Globalization,” 142.
49 Kenneth Chan is one author who has paid significant attention to the representations of race in the film, which 
he condenses under “the binary logic of [the] social responsibility [Han characters] versus personal freedom 
[non-Han characters]” (Chan, “The Global Return of the Wu Xia Pian,” 9). Contra the current reading, Chan 
perceptively finds political implications in this binarism, linking the representation of non-Han minorities in 
the film to Ang Lee’s perceived and salutary attempt to “unpack[s] Han hegemony in his formulation of a 
Chinese national imaginary,” which also “provides a political metaphor for the Chinese government’s role in the 
marginalization and oppression of recalcitrant ethnic minorities and territorial enclaves” as well as “a trope for 
the conflict the Taiwanese people face in confronting the larger national issue of Taiwan’s political reunification 
with mainland China” (Chan, “The Global Return of the Wu Xia Pian,” 10). Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh has likewise 
perceived a binarism in the representation of the two couples, which she interprets not racially, but as Ang Lee’s 
effort to “contain these problems by juxtaposing wenyi 文藝 and wuxia 武俠 and creating a tight synergy of 
these two styles” (“The Road Home,” 204). Yeh and Davis discuss the organization of characters along “binaries” 
and the consequent “binarization and structural simplicity” of the film, but do not list race/ethnicity among the 
“themes” these simple binaries are designed to convey to a “world audience” (Yeh and Davis, Taiwan Film 
Directors: A Treasure Island, 197). Jay finds the film to represent an “inclusionist China of blurred ethnicities.” 
See Jay, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon’: (Re)packaging Chinas and Selling the Hybridized Culture and 
Identity in an Age of Globalization,” 136.
Han Chinese are the film’s “role models,” in Ang Lee’s words, models of social conformity, 
displaying unswerving obedience to the government [Qing-Manchu50] and its laws, observing 
social mores, and upholding the patriarchal ethical codes of the jianghu brotherhood.51 Even in 
private, the Han heroes struggle to adhere to conservative social norms governing gender and 
sexual relations, and remain chaste in exchange for a higher, mystical, spiritual union that will 
apparently come in the afterlife. Their sexual propriety and celibacy are implicitly linked to 
their superior martial arts techniques, development of the mind-spirit complex being morally 
superior to any pleasures of the flesh and the key to proper training for righteous martial combat. 
Within the racially superior Han, there is an additional gender hierarchy as well: the Han hero, Li 
Mubai, is by racial and gender default the most physically, morally, and spiritually adept of all the 
characters. No woman will ever reach his level.52
Non-Han characters, on the other hand, are violators of the social, juridical, and familial 
codes, laws, mores, and values dear to the Han characters. In contrast to the civilized Han, they 
50 Ironically, a notable feature in CTHD and numerous other martial arts films is, for lack of a better term, the 
“Ah-Q postcolonialism” that is manifested in the representation of the Manchu colonization as a triumphal era of 
Han ethnicity and culture (and in related phenomena, such as cinematic treatments of the Opium War or the 2006 
PRC celebrations of Genghis Khan as a Chinese hero).
51 See Oriental Films, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon: An Interview with Ang Lee and James Schamus.” 
“Jianghu 江湖 encompasses an abstract community within the Chinese literary tradition that is ruled not by 
state legislation but by moral principle and decorum […] Its members are not above the state laws, but are 
accorded the moral authority to reject the implementation of those law should they serve corrupt ends. Crouching 
Tiger is sustained by the tension between the various characters and their varying abilities to adhere to jianghu 
principles.” See Chan, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Cultural Migrancy and Translatability,” 59. In the 
diegetic, the emphasis on Confucian “moral principle and decorum” across civil society and the jianghu world 
is in no way counterbalanced by a Buddhist ethic or “Taoist sensibility” (Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, 
Bouncing Angels,” 225) associated with the Wudan or other martial arts schools (Jay, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden 
Dragon’: (Re)packaging Chinas and Selling the Hybridized Culture and Identity in an Age of Globalization,” 
137). In fact, it is implied that the non-Han female characters’ (Jade-eyed Fox and Yu Jialong 玉嬌龍) ignorance 
and impulsive and selfish violations of (patriarchal) Confucian mores and civil laws and the Han ethical codes 
of the jianghu are precisely what keeps them from mastering the Wudan style. See Chow Kenny Ka-nin, “Hong 
Kong Animation: The Uncanny Brush in Wuxia film,” Asian Cinema 18.1 (Spring/Summer 2007): 138-49 for 
a recent concise history of the term wuxia. From a more syncretic perspective, one might say that Li Mubai’s 
combination of Confucian/Jianghu ethics and Chinese Taoist “stillness” and mysticism further elevates him 
above both the non-Han characters and Shu-lien.
52 Chan avers: “Each character has a social role to play within this world, and the gender relations depicted in the 
film are but part of this larger framework. There is no direct evidence of male oppression in the film other than 
the one we are primed to expect from the period setting of ancient China” (“Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: 
Cultural Migrancy and Translatability,” 61). While I find the film quite conservative where gender is concerned, 
I do not have space in the present essay to address this issue in detail.
32 33
frequently display animal-like barbarity and are associated with animals and animal traits. The 
menagerie includes a Manchu dragon53 and her evil teacher the “jade-eyed fox” who, having 
green eyes is not likely Han (she is apparently Manchu, as her feet are clearly not bound and since 
she refers to Shu Lien as “not one of us” “她是道上的人”: literally “she’s a member of the [Han] 
jianghu world”). The “tiger” is the film’s fantasy conglomeration of “an unspecified and collective 
non-Han minority,”54 a Turkistanish-Mongolianish hybrid. In a long flashback sequence, he is 
associated with the desert and coded as “middle eastern,” with curved sword, baggy pants, hirsute 
mien, jingling earrings, and singing a middle-eastern-sounding song, while in a subsequent scene 
he is the familiar [leader?] of a group of mountain herders dressed in what appears to be the attire 
of Mongolian sheep herders, on a cold snow-capped mountain plain, complete with background 
yurt. In addition to their names, throughout the film the non-Han minorities are associated with 
animals and animality: riding horses; living and having sex in caves; tearing into desert fowl 
directly from the skewer; two of the male Han characters refer to jade-eyed fox as a “bitch”55; the 
tiger sends messages by eagle; and crows appear with the fox.56 These primitives live by the law 
of nature: “ni shi wo huo” 你死我活 (“you die, I survive”; spoken by Jade-eyed Fox in a late 
scene), rather than the principles of true martial artists upheld by the Han characters, such as dao, 
xi, yi 道, 信, and 義 (the Way of proper behavior; honesty and trust; and chivalry, righteousness, 
philanthropy). In stark opposition to Jade-eyed Fox’s cutthroat ethical code, Yu Xiulien posits the 
latter two as the key to survival in the knight-errant world: “zuo jianghu, kao de shi ren shu, jiang 
xin, jiang yi.”	走江湖，靠的是人熟，講信，講義 (“In the jianghu world, one must rely on 
friends, trust, chivalry.”)
In direct contrast to their Han counterparts, the non-Han characters are prone to violence, 
53 Zhang Ziyi’s 章子怡 character is named Yu Jiaolong, but in the film’s subtitles and in the Chinese text of the 
published script (with a foreword by Ang Lee), the English transcription of her name is given as “Jen”; likewise, 
Michelle Yeoh’s 楊紫瓊 character is named Yu Xiulian while the English transcription of her name is given 
as “Yu Shu Lien”. Following Martin in “The China Simulacrum Martin” and others, I will use these English 
transcriptions from the script when referring to the characters. A further possible linguistic coding in the names of 
these characters: a very selective—and therefore tenuous—lexographic comparison reveals that Jen’s surname is 
homophonous with the word yǜ 慾 “desire, passion; lust; greed” while Xiulian’s surname is homophonous with 
(and written quite similarly to) yǘ 瑜 “fine and flawless jade or gemstone; virtues; excellences”. Furthermore, 
Jiaolong is literally “spoiled/pampered dragon.”
54 Jay, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon’: (Re)packaging Chinas and Selling the Hybridized Culture and Identity 
in an Age of Globalization,” 135.
55 Liu Taibao 劉泰保, aka “Bo” in the subtitles, played by Gao Xi’an 高西安, has just asked police inspector Tsai 
Jiu 蔡九 played by Wang Deming 王德明 if Jade Fox is a “male or female animal/bitch” (“這碧眼狐狸是公
的還是母的?”).
56 Granted, some of the ragtag bunch of Han martial artists who confront Jen in the teahouse have animal names 
as well, but they are still shown to follow—or at least profess to follow—the jianghu codes of chivalry and 
propriety, and it is Jen (Yu Jiaolong) who insults, boasts, threatens, then attacks them.
impetuously act on their emotions, cheat in battle, ignore laws, customs, mores, and propriety, 
and privilege the flesh over the mind and spirit, readily giving in to their animal lust. Jade Fox 
reveals that she slept with her martial arts mentor then later killed him in order to steal his 
sect’s sacred book of martial arts techniques. The stark contrast between heathen ethnics and 
Han heroes takes place within a clear narrative arc—the tale’s conservative dénouement implies 
that, having abandoned themselves to the pleasures of the flesh, the non-Hans are destined to 
forever remain inferior in the martial arts, endowed with a partial physical-technical mastery 
and relying on malicious and devious subterfuge but lacking the mental means, inner strength 
and spiritual quietude that pureblooded, responsible, and chaste Han heroes are able to commix 
with their superior gongfu 功夫, making them martial arts masters and respected champions of 
the jianghu world. Furthermore, the film offers a clear moral lesson from the Han perspective: 
the minority characters are made to suffer for their transgressions57; they endure physical and 
emotional anguish at the hands of their mentors, parents, and lovers (whom they have often 
themselves hurt), and they remain unsatisfied in their (sex-based) love relations. Jade-eyed Fox, 
having slept with then murdered her mentor and several other jianghu (Han) heroes and deceived 
and poisoned her protégée, suffers a horrid death, alone, bitter, and betrayed, spewing emotional 
venom at her adoptive “daughter” to her last gasp; Lo, an uncivilized brigand and burglar by 
profession, looses the love of his life and is left forlorn; Jen, having broken sacred familial and 
nuptial bonds, committed adultery, lied, stolen, vandalized, assaulted others, and betrayed the 
trust of nearly every other character in the film, chooses suicide over the chance to spend the rest 
of her life with her lover Lo. “There is a moral here, and nothing is more Confucian than a moral 
lesson.”58 But even before they meet their tragic fates, the non-Han antagonists are repeatedly and 
57 The conservative treatment of the youthful and impetuous minority characters is not present in Wang Dulu’s 
original series of novels, according to Tze-Lan Deborah Sang. Sang’s study of gender and ethnic identities in 
Wang Dulu’s series reveals “no flagrant biases against the Manchus or the Mongols” (personal correspondence). 
Ang Lee acknowledges “completely changing portions of the novel” for the screenplay, of which he wrote half 
(Berry, “Ang Lee: Freedom in Film,” 340). Interestingly, a 2000 revision of the novel, also entitled Crouching 
Tiger Hidden Dragon, which combines plot elements from two of Wang Dulu’s novels in the series (《寶劍
金釵》and《臥虎藏龍》), is quite straightforward about its conservative message, stating in the author’s 
preface: “Li Mubai, who avoids love for the sake of righteousness, is nonetheless able to be united with Yu 
Xiulian. Why does Yu Jiaolong, who renounces family for the sake of love, choose to have a fateful one night 
stand yet not remain together with Luo Xiaohu?” (Bi Xingguo, Wohu canglong: Chongchu jianghu ban 臥虎
藏龍︰重出江湖版 [Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Reemerging from the Underworld] (Taipei: Lianjing 
chuban shiye gongsi, 2000), 1; my own translation).
58 See Yeh and Davis, Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island, 195. Impulsiveness, rebellion, sexual passion, 
challenging social mores—any behavior or attitude fundamental to resistance and opposition—is cast in a 
negative light and associated with characters who ultimately find no lasting pleasure or happiness in life. In the 
film’s most romantic subplot, the two impetuous adolescent young non-Han lovers are associated with animality, 
violence, and criminality. Further aspersions are implicitly cast on Jen, through her numerous associations with 
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53 Zhang Ziyi’s 章子怡  character is named Yu Jiaolong, but in the film’s subtitles and in the Chinese text of the 
published script (with a foreword by Ang Lee), the English transcription of her name is given as “Jen”; likewise, 
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homophonous with the word yǜ 慾 “desire, passion; lust; greed” while Xiulian’s surname is homophonous with 
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54 Jay, “‘Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon’: (Re)packaging Chinas and Selling the Hybridized Culture and Identity 
in an Age of Globalization,” 135.
55 Liu Taibao 劉泰保, aka “Bo” in the subtitles, played by Gao Xi’an 高西安, has just asked police inspector Tsai 
Jiu 蔡九 played by Wang Deming 王德明 if Jade Fox is a “male or female animal/bitch” (“這碧眼狐狸是公
的還是母的?”).
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Wang Dulu’s series reveals “no flagrant biases against the Manchus or the Mongols” (personal correspondence). 
Ang Lee acknowledges “completely changing portions of the novel” for the screenplay, of which he wrote half 
(Berry, “Ang Lee: Freedom in Film,” 340). Interestingly, a 2000 revision of the novel, also entitled Crouching 
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58 See Yeh and Davis, Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island, 195. Impulsiveness, rebellion, sexual passion, 
challenging social mores—any behavior or attitude fundamental to resistance and opposition—is cast in a 
negative light and associated with characters who ultimately find no lasting pleasure or happiness in life. In the 
film’s most romantic subplot, the two impetuous adolescent young non-Han lovers are associated with animality, 
violence, and criminality. Further aspersions are implicitly cast on Jen, through her numerous associations with 
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disparagingly contrasted to the Han heroes.
Most telling is the scene in the bandit Turkoman “Tiger” Lo’s lair, where the two young 
minority protagonists make love, explicitly foregrounding the relation between race and feral 
sexuality. Their coupling occurs during a childish tussle between the two, immediately after 
“Dragon” Jen carefully spells out for Lo and the viewer that she is Manchurian, and not Han 
Chinese. Following this, she sticks a crossbow arrow into his chest, they struggle and then give 
in to their aggressive, adulterous (she is engaged), and bestial lust on the floor of a cave.59 This 
scene demands to be contrasted to the penultimate scene in the film, which also takes place on 
the floor of a cave60, where the Han heroes display the more proper, civilized, refined version 
of loving physical intimacy. As a fatally poisoned Li Mubai sits in meditation, he decides to use 
his final breath to speak his heart to Yu Xiulien. Though she exhorts him not to waste his last 
breath on her and instead use it to meditate toward a higher level of spiritual enlightenment, with 
his dying breath he professes his deep love for her, as his body tumbles backward. A weeping 
Xiulien rushes over to embrace and kiss him, as he vows that his love for her will sustain him in 
the afterlife, where he’ll willingly follow her around as a spirit.61 The contrast to the language 
her governess. When critics fail to contextualize Zhang Ziyi’s character Jen within the value-coded racializing 
framework of the film, it leads to differing interpretations of this “young upstart” who “achieves freedom from 
emotional, familial, and social inhibitions” in Lu, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 225; 
but manifests a “failure to comprehend jianghu etiquette and values” in Chan, “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: 
Cultural Migrancy and Translatability,” 60; and is a character whose representation is so “multicoded” she can 
for some audiences be “descendant of the legion celluloid nüxia 女俠 dating back to the 1920s,” for others 
“a far-flung sister to Buffy, Max, Lara, and Xena” in Martin [in an otherwise masterful survey of the film’s 
reception], “The China Simulacrum,” 156. See Yeh and Davis for a nuanced reading of Jen’s character, taking 
into account Confucian-moralist and other perspectives (Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island, 198). Cai 
Rong’s analysis of “gender images in martial arts discourse” in CTHD notes the film’s “conventional binarism.” 
See Cai, “Gender Imaginations in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and the Wuxia World,” positions: east asia 
cultures critique 13.2 (Fall 2005): 443, 461.
59 Robert Stam reminds us of Fanon’s argument, in language that resonates powerfully with the dynamics of this 
film, that “the colonizer ‘cannot speak of the colonized without having recourse to the bestiary’[…] [and] the […] 
‘animalizing trope,’ the discursive figure by which the colonizing imaginary rendered the colonized as beastlike 
and animalic.” See Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, eds., Multiculturalism, Postcoloniality, and Transnational 
Media, 19. To paraphrase Shohat and Stam, “[t]he ideological production of Han Chinese rationality and civility 
goes hand in hand with the production of non-Han irrationality and immorality” (13).
60 In the script, the setting for this scene is described as “廢棄作坊,” an abandoned workshop or abandoned mill, 
but the mise-en-scène, lighting, and camera angles convey a thoroughly cave-like appearance and atmosphere.
61 Yu Xiulien and Li Mubai’s final conversation does not appear in the published script. That version is arguably 
even more conservative, as Li Mubai says, “Xiulien, agree to marry me [this moment] […] I—won’t wait until 
I’m a ghost to be able to love you!” A sobbing Xiulien cries out “I long ago consented!” See Wang Huiling, James 
Schamus, and Cai Guorong, Wohu Canglong 臥虎藏龍 [Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, based on the original 
and behavior of the other pair of lovers is even more pronounced if we recall that Li Mubai and 
Xiulien would have likely been able to “live happily ever after,” had it not been for the murderous 
schemes, foolish impetuousness and irascibility of the non-Han characters.62 A final coda is added 
to this heartrending scene, should the abundant moral fortitude and respect for social propriety 
of the Han characters not be fully evident: Liu Taibao is shown in a heavy downpour outside the 
cave, struggling with the corpse of Jade-eyed Fox, giving his ferociously evil non-Han enemy a 
proper burial in a freshly-dug grave.
In a much earlier scene, the first appearance of a non-Han protagonist establishes the 
hierarchical representational codes in which the racial other invariably appears as a violator of 
the ethical values and social mores of decent civilized (Han) people. Yu Xiulien and a butler, both 
dressed in muted tones, are poised to enter the private study (shuzhai 書齋) of the master of the 
(Han architectural) mansion, Sir Te (a.k.a. Beileye63). They are momentarily speechless, shocked 
to see the Manchu princess Jen (Yu Jiaolong, the “dragon”) already inside, in clear, shameless 
violation of propriety. Against a background of calligraphic scrolls and other literary symbols 
(mostly gray, black, and white) of the traditional Han male elite, her colorful costume, exquisitely 
made up hair, jewelry, and haughty deportment all serve to visually emphasize her egregious 
trespass into what is traditionally the most private cloister of a Han Chinese scholar-official. In 
a subsequent scene, Jen and Xiulien are having a conversation in which Jen repeatedly reveals 
her impulsiveness, violent streak, and disregard for propriety, as they discuss the jianghu life and 
marriage. In each instance, she is politely countered with a measured, corrective response from 
Xiulien, invoking jianghu ethical codes (see above) and touting marriage as the most important 
and inevitable event in a woman’s life.64 As Ang Lee intends, Xiulien’s “[s]peech, as well as 
novel by Wang Dulu; Chinese Filmscript, cast list, and photos, with preface by Ang Lee] (Xindian: Tianxing 
Guoji wenhua, 2000), 135; my own translation.
62 We must also note that only the seductive lure of the primitive other is shown to sexually arouse and distract 
the otherwise reserved and spiritually centered Li Mubai (with fatal results), as he pursues Jen in the previous 
bamboo grove sequence and the earlier part of this cave scene.
63 The appellation “Beile” 貝勒 refers to “a Manchu prince.” See Immanuel C.Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 
6th Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 23. Nonetheless, the casting choice of Lung Sihung 
郎雄, the patriarchal character actor from Lee’s popular “father knows best” trilogy (Tuishou 推手	 [Pushing 
Hands], 1992; Xiyan 喜宴	[The Wedding Banquet], 1993; and Yinshi nannü 飲食男女	[Eat Drink Man Woman], 
1994), combined with his sympathetic portrayal as the fatherly mentor and family friend of Xiulien (and Li 
Mubai), as well as his words and actions (and home) in the film, all serve to mark him as a thoroughly Sinicized, 
Han-assimilated character in the film.
64 As Martin notes, “Jen sees the jianghu underworld as one of unfettered freedom and fails to understand the 
chivalric code of honor by which its warriors must treat one another […] she offends people left and right 
by failing to observe the chivalric code, instead cutting a swathe of indiscriminate destruction.” (“The China 
Simulacrum,” 152). Berry and Farquhar see Jen’s rejection of “both the Confucian and underworld [jianghu] 
codes of conduct” as part of her “quest for individual freedom,” making her “not a villain but a very modern 
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deportment, dress, movement, and attitude are all supposed to be governed by the Confucian 
ideal of li.”65
Scenes like this proliferate throughout the movie. Without fail, Han characters stand out as 
more positive or superior when interacting with non-Hans. Other sequences feature one scene in 
which Han characters interact with one another in a civil and courteous manner while a parallel 
scene will emphasize non-Han characters’ uncivilized, devious, haughty, barbaric nature. In each 
case, the “binary minority/majority” serves to valorize the “social and political hierarchy.”66 In 
addition to the cave scenes analyzed above, compare, for example, the following pairs of eating 
scenes.
In the first scene, we witness the preparation and eating of a meal (stew), in which the 
Han characters’ use of utensils (pots, bowls, chopsticks) and strict observance of propriety by 
the filial daughter are foregrounded.67 Viewers are shown that, even in the most dilapidated and 
dirty hovel, the Han at table are fastidious upholders of manners, familial obligations, and gender 
hierarchies. Significantly, when their meal is rudely (and almost homicidally) interrupted, it is 
by a lethally aimed message dart from the non-Han Jade-eyed Fox. Bo runs to the door but the 
Fox has fled. In the later parallel scene, Jen (Zhang Ziyi) and the bandit Lo are on the floor of 
Lo’s cave, he handing her a crooked stick skewer with the bark still on it, she grabbing it and 
ravenously tearing into the cooked animal carcass with her teeth, then sloppily slurping down 
(horse milk68) directly from a wooden bowl.
Another eating/drinking sequence begins with Jen at a pastoral outdoor teashop. Even before 
ordering, her first act is to abruptly clutch the (Han) serving girl’s hand and reprimand her for 
setting down a filthy drinking cup, then smugly grinning at her own behavior. Her actions attract 
a pair of Han martial artists who appear bothered by her lack of respect toward the serving girl 
yet civilly introduce themselves and inquire if they may be of assistance to someone like Jen who 
isn’t familiar with the area. She proceeds to insult them and cut their weapons in half with her 
sword, while lying that she has defeated Li Mubai in combat. This scene is immediately followed 
by a contrasting parallel scene of Li Mubai and Yu Xiulien sharing a cup of tea at a secluded small 
pavilion in the forest. Even while discussing their passion and other deep matters, their behavior 
heroine” (China on Screen: Cinema and Nation, 72). Martin, Berry and Farquhar, Yeh and Davis, and others are 
not mistaken in stressing Jen’s adolescent quest for freedom from authority, but the overarching racial binarism 
structuring the representation of characters and themes in the film overrides the sympathetic cinematic codes of 
romantic youthful rebellion, casting a negative light on Jen (and Xiaohu 小虎 [Little Tiger]).
65 Yeh and Davis, Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island, 186.
66 See Gladney, Dislocating China, 91. Gladney’s enlightening account of minority representation in Chinese 
cinema (74-98) considers, among many issues, the contribution that such films make to constructing “an 
‘imagined’ national identity” (91). CTHD contributes to both an imagined Chinese national and global identity.
67 Police inspector Tsai’s daughter uses her chopsticks to prevent Bo from taking the first bite of stew, before her 
father.
68 According to the script (Wang, et al., Wohu Canglong, 86).
is thoroughly civil and restrained, in stark contrast to the previous scene.
The following sequence has Jen displaying even more egregiously transgressive epicurean 
behavior. It takes place inside a large restaurant, where a lone Jen first orders a large and wasteful 
amount of exotic dishes. When the waiter complains that his humble restaurant doesn’t serve such 
delicacies, she commands him to quickly procure her dishes from a larger restaurant. In addition 
to her rudeness and arrogance, the scene shows Jen to view the preparation and consumption 
of food more as amusement than sustenance (just as she has earlier stolen the sword “wo zhi 
xiang wan wan” 我只想玩玩 (“merely for fun”). She then insults a group of Han martial artists, 
provoking a fight in which she defeats them all, wounding many and destroying much of the 
restaurant, bragging all the while.
To restate, these pairs of scenes and other scenes in the film are structured around a racial 
binary, contrasting the behavior and disposition of Han characters to that of non-Han characters. 
The latter are represented as domestic non-Han others who are “less-than-us,” and whose brash, 
lawless, and uncouth behavior and deportment are the perfect foil against which the manifest 
racial and cultural superiority of Han Chinese can be displayed.
The film’s racial othering, as I will elaborate below, is integral to its combination of cultural 
nationalism and transnational “branding,” a marker of Chinese ethnic and nationalist aspirations 
to the position of subject and agent on the global stage. Furthermore, the premodern era depicted 
in the film allows for a rearticulation of the well-established anachronistic Hollywood/global 
image of a passive and exotic China without making any overt claims to ethnic or nationalist 
superiority in the present; in the words of Yeh and Davis “Crouching Tiger […] rehabilitates the 
reputation of a whole genre and renders it a beacon of cultural China.”69 Nevertheless, in the 
process of attaining global visibility for a transformed image of China, the ideologies of cultural 
nationalism and racial supremacy are effectively bolstered, propelled and enhanced, sans any 
forthright contemporary jingoistic ramifications.70
Couching Race in the Global Era
[…] [C]ulture is vital to the credibility China wishes to attain as a 
holistic nation amongst the leading global powers.
—Karen Smith71
To go global, China must perfect its cultural policy and rebuild the 
69 Yeh and Davis, Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island, 182.
70 For a more accepting interpretation, see Yeh and Davis’s view that “[t]he aesthetic of defiance and assertive 
cultural nationalism is gone, but a vague wistfulness and longing for cultural China remains.” Yeh and Davis, 
Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island, 182.
71 Karen Smith, “The Future: in Whose Hands?” Yishu: Journal of Contemporary Chinese Art (Jun. 2004) (Summer 
Issue): 56.
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65 Yeh and Davis, Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island, 186.
66 See Gladney, Dislocating China, 91. Gladney’s enlightening account of minority representation in Chinese 
cinema (74-98) considers, among many issues, the contribution that such films make to constructing “an 
‘imagined’ national identity” (91). CTHD contributes to both an imagined Chinese national and global identity.
67 Police inspector Tsai’s daughter uses her chopsticks to prevent Bo from taking the first bite of stew, before her 
father.
68 According to the script (Wang, et al., Wohu Canglong, 86).
is thoroughly civil and restrained, in stark contrast to the previous scene.
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Couching Race in the Global Era
[…] [C]ulture is vital to the credibility China wishes to attain as a 
holistic nation amongst the leading global powers.
—Karen Smith71
To go global, China must perfect its cultural policy and rebuild the 
69 Yeh and Davis, Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island, 182.
70 For a more accepting interpretation, see Yeh and Davis’s view that “[t]he aesthetic of defiance and assertive 
cultural nationalism is gone, but a vague wistfulness and longing for cultural China remains.” Yeh and Davis, 
Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island, 182.
71 Karen Smith, “The Future: in Whose Hands?” Yishu: Journal of Contemporary Chinese Art (Jun. 2004) (Summer 
Issue): 56.
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image of Chinese culture.72
American audiences will gain a deeper understanding of Chinese 
culture by watching Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon.
—Lee Cher-jean73
The previously-mentioned accolades for this film’s glorification of China and the Chinese 
people, when combined with an awareness of its racial dynamic, mark the point, I believe, where 
CTHD augurs a new development in the “production of difference for exoticist consumption,” a 
development that is both within and beyond critiques of the globalization of (Chinese) culture 
such as Shih Shu-mei’s powerful exposé of “managed multiculturalism.”
A new global identity is being formed for China and the Chinese, and the transnational film 
market is a major venue for making this image visible. No longer satisfied with nor limited to 
the occasional art-house or international film festival success, many Chinese spectators and film 
industry personnel see the financial and critical successes of CTHD as a bellwether of Chinese 
cinema’s emergent cultural-economic power in transnational commercial cinema, its reception 
as a mark of their ascendancy and visibility as global subjects, and its content as a thoroughly 
edifying and appropriate representation of Chinese people and culture.74
Martina Köppel-Yang has recently commented on China’s increasingly visible desire to 
promote a new self-image:
This new China presents itself with a new image and a new identity 
[…] On the one hand, continuity guarantees stability and China 
therefore appears as a reliable partner in the international community. 
On the other hand, it assures a specific cultural identity, substantiating 
the concept of the local within the global. Thus the image of the PR 
China […] as that of a country that at the “wake of the new millennium 
72 People’s Daily Editorial, cited in Antoaneta Bezlova, “From Cultural Revolution to Culture Exports,” Inter 
Press Service (Jul. 28, 2006), reprinted in Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/
cultural/2006/0728china.htm.
73 Cited in Martin, “The China Simulacrum,” 158. Lee is the former Deputy Director-General of the R.O.C. 
Government Information Office.
74 I would also note that the appearance of sophisticated special effects and state-of-the-art CGI technology 
contributes to the globalized cultural nationalist identity I’ve been discussing, for it feeds into the transnational 
Chinese spectator’s pride in and association with new signs of China’s cultural advancement, part of what Wu 
Hung, has termed the “obsessive pursuit of dangdaixing 當代性 or ‘contemporaneity’.” See Wu Hung “About 
between Past and Future: New Photography and Video from China,” Journal of Contemporary Chinese Art 
(Jun. 2004) (Summer Issue): 7. See Shih Shu-mei, “Globalisation and Minoritisation” for a similar discussion of 
spectator reception of Ang Lee’s The Wedding Banquet.
(kua shiji [跨世紀])” has entered into a new stage of its historical 
development, that of globalization, thus joining the international 
community on an equal footing without forgetting its cultural roots.75
As Köppel-Yang and the People’s Daily editorial cited above indicate, this new “image of 
Chinese culture” must incorporate both the local and the global. The creation and circulation 
of new images of China will need to reconfigure China’s traditional symbolic function in the 
global cultural imaginary from exotic, subaltern other/object into a more commanding subject 
with the agency, identity, appearance, behavior, and strength associated with a global power. To 
forge this new Chinese transnational identity and to occupy the position of a global subject,76 
representations of China and the (Han) Chinese must be dissociated from still-prevalent images 
of China as a subordinate race, ethnicity, and culture in the global popular imagination.77 The 
discrediting of subalternized images of China hinges upon effectively supplanting them in the 
75 See Martina Köppel-Yang, “The Ping-Pong Policy of Contemporary Chinese Art,” Journal of Contemporary 
Chinese Art (Jun. 2004) (Summer Issue): 60-66. For a contrasting view that perceives a zero-sum antagonistic 
tension between “national specificity” and a “more transnationally powerful, assertive, and successful […] 
universality,” see Hedetoft, “Contemporary Cinema,” 280). See also Jing Wang for an analysis of the relationship 
between a “resurgent nativism,” growing Chinese affluence, “cultural capital,” “international cosmopolitanism,” 
and China’s “bid for global citizenship” in Wang, “Culture as Leisure and Culture as Capital,” positions: east 
asia cultures critique 9.1 (Spring 2001): 97-98, and passim.
76 My working definition of the terms “subject” and “subjectivity” in this specific argument is akin to the Lacanian 
imaginary and Freudian ego (defense ego in some later formulations), both of which refer to the collective 
conscious identifications subjects construct for themselves and their national identities. “Subjectivity” in this 
usage, is analogous to the notion of “identity,” which necessitates and cannot exist without its real and imagined 
objects/others, the two (subject/self and object/other) normally being separated and distinguished via conscious 
and unconscious processes of selection, disavowal, projection, repression, etc. Spivak has referred to this as the 
“colloquial language” version of subjectivity, distinguishing it from a “subject-formation producing the reflexive 
basis for self-conscious social agency.” See Gatyatari Spivak, “Not Really a Properly Intellectual Response: An 
Interview with Gayatari Spivak,” positions: east asia cultures critique 12.1 (Spring 2004): 153. For a thorough, 
lucid, and rigorous definition of subjectivity, see Walter A. Davis, Inwardness and Existence: Subjectivity in/and 
Hegel, Heidegger, Marx, and Freud (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989).
77 These include orientalizing, self-orientalizing, feminizing, exoticizing, and other subalternizing representational 
schema. See Kaldis for a discussion of the criticism of Chinese films (many by Zhang Yimou and other 5th 
generation filmmakers), which deplores the selling of false, exoticized images of China to Western viewers 
presumably eager for simple, unthreatening, frequently sexualized representations of “China.” See Nick Kaldis, 
“Compulsory Orientalism: Hou Hsiao-hsien’s Flowers of Shanghai,” in ed. Chris Berry and Lu Feii, Island on 
the Edge: Taiwan New Cinema and After, 127-36. Sheldon Lu asks, somewhat rhetorically, whether or not Ang 
Lee is “susceptible to the accusation of orientalist self-fantasy” for making CTHD (“Crouching Tiger, Hidden 
Dragon, Bouncing Angels,” 227).
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popular imagination. CTHD achieves this by creating transnationally-circulating images of 
China’s own internal subaltern and exotic others against which Han China’s innately superior 
race and culture can be favorably portrayed.78 The status of global subject cannot be achieved, in 
other words, while one’s representation and self-representation—one’s identity—is consistently 
subalternized, defined as the other of the very global symbolic order one wishes to enter as an 
equal and competitive player. To establish and consolidate its niche in the global order, China has 
to produce cultural products that represent it not as an (exotic) object in/for the global cultural 
imaginary, but as a vigorous and ascendant national subject.
To reiterate, the Chinese subject projected and imagined in the production and reception 
of CTHD yokes a (renewed) vigorous ethnic and national identity79 to an emergent image of 
a powerful, “centered,” and assertive global subject, the latter being part of “a larger desire by 
wealthier Asian nations to take their cultural place in the New World Order.”80 The film’s content 
also implies that there is nothing overtly threatening about this “strong and centered” subject, for 
it incarnates a model national/global citizen and protector of the status quo whose superiority is 
established at the expense of domestic subalternized others. This film thereby makes a notable 
cinematic contribution to the transnational forging of a new image of China as a stable, moral, 
and vigorous authority, dominating over its own internal racialized others and, by implication, 
less civilized and inferior external others. In the process, the image of the Chinese nation and 
people visually renounces its longstanding function as passive other to images of more dominant 
(Western) peoples and nations in the global imaginary.
I believe the clear racial binarism in the film has so easily passed unnoticed or un-remarked 
upon in part because the film serves a localized (in Chinese communities), counter-hegemonic 
78 For recent rigorous psychoanalytic interpretations of the dynamics of racism and nationalism in the 21st-century, 
see the work of Slavoj Žižek and numerous articles in the journal Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (formerly 
Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture & Society), especially Vol. 9, Issue 2 (Aug. 2004). For a psychoanalytic 
interpretation of superego development and functioning in Chinese culture, see Yao Ping, “Some Observations 
on the Superego in China and in the United States,” Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture & Society 7.2 (Fall 
2002): 190-95.
79 See essays in Colin Mackerras, ed., Ethnicity in Asia (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) for numerous elaborations 
of the historically-contingent nature of Han Chinese and other types of (discourses of) Asian identity.
80 See C. J. W.-L. Wee, “Staging the Asian Modern: Cultural Fragments, the Singaporean Eunuch, and the Asian 
Lear,” Critical Inquiry 30.4 (Summer 2004): 773. In a similar vein, Rey Chow addresses the desire for global 
visibility embodied in Chinese films, with an in-depth analysis of how “sentimentality” in Chinese films functions 
as one of several “forms of attachment [that] are likely to persist—and evolve—in the age of global visibility” 
(Sentimental Fabulations, Contemporary Chinese Films, 200; see also 17-23). Borrowing from both Wee and 
Chow, I argue that the “Chinese” desires and aspirations that I speak of as being embodied in the film are 
one such form of attachment, and are not necessarily in this case the (conscious) product of auteur/authorial 
intention, nor can they be exclusively located in a single person, locale, or document; they are instead captured 
in phenomena such as the transnational production and reception of this film.
fantasy of an exalted and unspoiled Chinese essence that resists all that is negative, barbaric, 
impulsive, acquisitive, violent and destructive in the [Westernized] process of globalization.81 
Chinese cultural producers and audiences can bask in the reflected glow of the film’s success 
and its representation of “Chineseness,” while simultaneously disavowing their assimilation into 
the Westernizing (American-Euro) norms of the global economy. Furthermore, many educated 
domestic and diasporic Chinese, well-versed in the discourses and dynamics of Orientalism and 
globalization, share a strong desire to see a new cinematic image of ethnic China being consumed 
in the global marketplace, for they understand that “circulating signs of ethnicity is one of the main 
ways cinema helps to construct national identity.”82 CTHD demonstrates that one method for the 
construction, maintenance, and updating of Chinese national identity in the era of globalization is 
through the production of cinematic images of its own internalized subaltern and exotic others.83 
For China to be a subject rather than an object in the global imaginary is “an inherent part of a 
contemporary global problematic of becoming visible,” and this essay examines representations 
of race/ethnicity in CTHD as “the less immediately or sensorially detectable elements helping to 
propel, enhance, [or obstruct] such visibility.” The impact of an increasing visibility of racialized 
81 I can agree with Dirlik that the knee-jerk reactions of some “U.S. scholars’” against any manifestation of cultural 
nationalism can empower westernization and globalization by impeding “those who inhabit Asia or East Asia” 
from asserting “autonomous identities against a hegemonic globalization” (“Culture against History? The 
Politics of East Asian Identity,” 202). However, in the present essay, I am exposing what I believe to be an 
insidious intra-Asian racist dynamic that empowers this film’s particular instantiation of a nascent Chinese global 
identity. Furthermore, this identity is celebrated not as a local resistance to globalization, but rather as proof that 
Chinese people have ascended to a place of power and visibility on the global stage. For other perspectives, 
see Liu on China’s “spectacular” failure “to reconstruct a new cultural and ideological counterhegemony.” See 
Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004), 12, and 
passim; Lu on the potential for liberation of “the local from domination by the party-state” that globalization 
offers. See Sheldon H. Lu, China, Transnational Visuality, Global Postmodernity (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2001), 73 and passim, Wee for an optimistic view of the way globalization facilitates “a potentially 
emerging Asian metropole in relation to the modern capitalist West inextricably in its midst” (“Staging the Asian 
Modern,” 774), and Haugerud for a nuanced reading of the problematics of construing the local in opposition to 
the global. See Angelique Haugerud, “The Disappearing Local: Rethinking Global-Local Connections,” in ed. 
Ali Mirsepassi, Amrita Basu, and Frederic Weaver, Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World: Recasting the 
Area Studies Debate, 60-81.
82 See Berry and Farquhar, China on Screen: Cinema and Nation, 171. From a psychoanalytic perspective, a 
national identity grounded in ethnic difference is attained by the projection of one’s own abject qualities onto 
a racial other within the nation’s cultural and geographic borders. One’s anxieties and weaknesses vis-à-vis the 
global order are thereby translated into local relationships with one’s domestic others.
83 Spivak and others have demonstrated that “the colonizing Other is established at the same time as its colonized 
others are produced as subjects.” See Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, “othering,” in Post-
Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts (London: Routledge, 2000), 171.
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cinematic images in the global market should not be underestimated, for as Song Hwee Lim has 
forcefully argued, “both ‘representation’ and ‘reality’ should be understood as social discourses 
that, by their performativity, not only reify those images, but also codify them as positive or 
negative.”84
The process I’ve described marks a departure from the representational dynamics encapsulated 
in Shih Shu-mei’s description of the “new rainbowlike globe […] [where] Culturalization now 
substitutes for racialization” and “[r]ace becomes culturalized to such an extent that it all but 
disappears, even though it continues to structure hierarchies of power.”85 In CTHD’s creation of 
a new Chinese image and identity for global consumption, race, I am arguing, does not disappear 
but reappears in a different guise, being manipulated to new ends by a formerly subalternized 
Third World other against a newly-reconstituted vision of its own internalized and subalternized 
racial others.86 Race is now the signifier of an inferior domestic other, a sign and necessary 
byproduct of Chinese aspirations to the position of subject on the global stage.
Conclusion
Even if the nature of their production, content, and reception bears witness to the “gradual 
deterritorialization of culture” and the eliding of local and historical specificities that are not 
appealing and marketable to a world-wide audience, as transnational Chinese films begin to 
compete for larger shares of global box office revenues87 they will likely continue to construct 
a variety of new identities, images, and representations of China for domestic and international 
consumption.88 The production of China as a “brand state”89 is fully underway. As this dynamic 
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racial relations in CTHD, I am not gesturing toward a utopian alternative. Rather, my goal is to 
intervene in and arrest the process before it advances without resistance or debate.
Finally, I recall the words of Hamid Naficy:
In the unipolar, postmodern world of today, globalized capital, 
deterritorialization, fragmentation, and uncertainty are all immanent 
and imminent. Under such circumstances, nations and communities 
everywhere seem to be involved in creating an other(s) against whom 
they can best (re)define themselves […] not only (re)creating actual, 
material borders but also […] drawing new discursive boundaries 
between the self and its others.95 ※
pseudo-solidarities offered by ethnic loyalty’.” Cited in Derek Conrad Murray, “Hip-Hop vs. High Art: Notes 
on Race as Spectacle,” art journal 63.2 (Summer 2004): 11. For more psychoanalytic analyses of race, see the 
essays collected in Psychoanalysis, Culture, and Society 9.2 (Aug. 2004); see individual articles in other issues 
as well.
95 Naficy, “Phobic Spaces and Liminal Panics,” 222-23.
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